631 Kiely Boulevard * Santa Clara, CA 95051 * Phone 408/248-1815 * Fax 408/985-9716 * E-mail bob@plrc.org

PLRC-030503

This paper is current only to 3 May 2003

UNDERSTANDING THE "WAR ON TERRORISM": "PAX AMERICANA" AND PREEMPTIVE FORCE¹

Compiled by Bob Aldridge

We American are experiencing events in our country today that have no precedent in American history. We have been attacked by terrorists. Civil liberties have been severely curbed by the Patriot Act and other legislation. We have conquered Afghanistan which was virtually undefended. Now we are unilaterally waging a war of aggression based on questionable evidence and in the face of global objections. In this paper I will illustrate how a small but persistent group of neoconservatives can form this country's policies, even when faced with public resistance to those policies.² In doing so I will outline a sinister plan designed to give global military and economic dominance to the United States, and I will highlight how regime change in Iraq is the first step in that plan. It started over a decade ago.

I. PAX AMERICANA

"Pax Americana" literally means "American Peace." It is derived from the term "Pax Romana" which, according to *Webster's New World Dictionary*, means: "1) the terms of peace imposed by Rome (America) on any of its dominions; 2) any peace dictated to a subjugated people by a conquering nation." Many observers have appropriately translated this term as "American Empire." Here I will explain how and why this term came into use. The first indication of American imperial ambitions in the post-cold war world surface in 1992 with the initial draft of a document called *Defense Planning Guidance*.

¹This paper is part of a series on understanding why we are fighting terrorism. There is nothing new in it that hasn't been published elsewhere, and of course the coverage is not comprehensive. The purpose of this paper is to compile some pertinent information together so that a pattern can be seen. In this paper I will illustrated how the Bush administration is taking advantage of the "war on terrorism" to advance a plan for global military and economic superiority that has been developing for over a decade. BA

²I believe the term "neo-conservative" literally refers to a democrat who has switched to the republican party. However, for lack of something better, I will use that term in this paper to denote a staunch supporter of Pax Americana and the use of preemptive force.

³Webster's New World Dictionary, 2nd College Edition.

A. 1992 DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE

By 1991 the Soviet Union had collapsed and the Persian Gulf war had come to an inconclusive end. The first President George Bush announced a "New World Order" in which the US was the sole remaining superpower. To maintain that status, then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney (now vice president) in early 1992 had a new *Defense Planning Guidance* drawn up. Directing the preparation of this document were then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz (now deputy defense secretary -- Rumsfeld's #2 man) and then Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy I. Lewis Libby (now the vice president's chief of staff). But when a 46-page classified draft of the document being circulated was leaked to *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, it created such an uproar that Cheney was instructed to rewrite it.

I tried to obtain a copy of the original draft of that controversial 1992 *Defense Planning Guidance* but the internet links went to a page that had been deactivated. It is apparently no longer available on the web. But excerpts have been published in various places which indicate that it was the beginning of "Pax Americana" -- an American peace. More accurately, peace on America's terms. For instance, Barton Gellman, the *Washington Post* reporter to whom the document was leaked, quotes the bigger picture emphasized in the document: "Our number one mission in the world, now that we are the sole superpower, is to make sure we stay that way."

According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the document called for preemptive attacks. It also called for ad hoc coalitions such as was used in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but also said America should be prepared to act alone when "collective action cannot be orchestrated." Such action was illustrated as military intervention in Iraq to assure "access to vital raw material, primarily Persian Gulf oil," as well as prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.⁶ Remember, this was in 1992. Well before 9-11 or even the rise of Osama bin Laden as a leader of terrorists.

Frontline, a PBS documentary, also published excerpts from the 1992 draft *Defense Planning Guidance* on their website. "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival," declares the document. That means "to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power." The draft document then itemized three additional aspects to that objective:

- "the US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests."
- "in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order."
- "we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."

⁴This document is also referred to by some authors as the Defense Policy Guidance.

⁵Cited in Gellman, 20 February 2003.

⁶Quotations in this paragraph are cited in Carnegie Endowment Proliferation Brief.

⁷Quotations in this paragraph are cited in Frontline.

Read that last paragraph over carefully to absorb all its meaning. It is arrogant. It is blatant. It describes peace on America's terms or no peace at all. It is no wonder that Cheney had to instruct Wolfowitz and Libby to tone it down **after** it was leaked to the public.

But there is more. The leaked document gets more definitive by listing several potential causes of regional conflict in which US interests could be threatened:

- "access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil,"
- "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,"
- "threats to US citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and"
- "threats to US society from narcotics trafficking."8

The first of those can be seen as a major reason for the present war on Iraq. The second and third are the declared justification for that war. The basis for these potential causes were seven scenarios for conflict with particular emphasis on Iraq and North Korea. Skirting any reference to acting through the United Nations, the 1992 draft said the US "should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies." But most important is "the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the US" and that "the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated..."

But all of this took place back in 1992, and it was squelched and toned down. What has that got to do with today? We only need to look at subsequent developments to see how that determined group of neo-conservatives continued to make inroads into US policy.

B. 1998 LETTER TO PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON

A letter signed by 18 neo-conservatives and dated 26 January 1998 was sent to President Clinton just days before he delivered his State-Of-The-Union message. In the hopes of influencing his policy announcements, the letter urged him "to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the US and our friends around the world That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power."¹⁰

The letter went on to assert that the policy of containment was not working and that America's allies could not be counted on to continue supporting sanctions. It pointed out that lack of cooperation with weapons inspectors "has substantially reduced" our ability to assure Saddam is not building weapons of mass destruction, and that it is "difficult if not impossible" to monitor chemical and biological weapons production.

Then the letter blatantly stated: "The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That needs to become the aim of American foreign policy."

Of the 18 signatories to that letter, 11 currently hold positions in the Bush administration. Besides Wolfowitz, they are Elliott Abrams (Senior Director in the National Security Council), Richard Armitage (currently Deputy Secretary of State), John R. Bolton (Under Secretary of State

⁸ Cited in	Frontline.
9Ibid	

¹⁰Clinton letter.

¹¹Ibid.

for Arms Control and International Security), Paula J. Dobriansky (Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs), Zalmay Khalilzad (US Special Envoy to the Iraqi opposition), Richard Perle (member of the

Defense Policy Board¹²), Peter W. Rodman (Assistant secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), William Schneider, Jr. (Chairman of Defense Science Board), and Robert B. Zoellick (US Trade Representative). All of the signers are indicated in Appendix-A, along with their past and present government positions and their current organization membership.

When Saddam evicted the UN weapons inspectors in December 1998, Clinton did unleash a four-day barrage on Iraq code-named Desert Fox. But that was suspected to be more of a ploy to affect his impeachment vote than a response to the letter.

C. THE SEPTEMBER 2000 REPORT -- REBUILDING AMERICA'S DEFENSES

In the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American Century¹³ (hereinafter referred to as the Project) was founded as a non-profit, educational organization with the goal of promoting America as the global leader. The Co-founders were Robert Kagan and William Kristol -- both of whom later signed the 1998 letter to Clinton. In its founding *Statement of Principles* the Project asks: "Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American Principles and Interests?" Then they point out that what is required to shape such a century is "a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges, a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad, and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities." Finally they warn that "the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise." Those sound like noble overall goals but let us look at the details.

Distressed by the flat-line military spending of the 1990s, the Project began a study of defense plans and resource requirements in the spring of 1998. This culminated in a September 2000 report entitled *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century* (hereafter referred to as The 2000 Report). Thomas Donnelly is the principal author and 27 people from a wide spectrum of specialties contributed to The Report. As the subtitle implies, this report contains 76 pages that thoroughly treat everything from strategy and policy to deployment and procurement. While blaming the weakness the authors perceive on past force reviews and procurement quantities being budget driven, The Report is more of a dream list for unlimited resources which would bankrupt America and put virtually every working family below the poverty

¹²The Defense Policy Board is the defense secretary's private advisory panel, until recently (March 27th) chaired by Richard Perle -- a Reagan-era Pentagon hardliner dubbed the "Prince of Darkness." Its 31 unpaid members include former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Vice President Dan Quayle, former House Speakers Newt Gingrich and Thomas Foley, former CIA chief James Woolsey, former Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger and Harold Brown, retired Admirals David Jeremiah and William Owens, former Pentagon aide Kenneth Adelman, former Air Force Chief of Staff Ronald Fogleman, retired Marine General Jack Sheehan. and military expert Eliot Cohen.

¹³Project for the New American Century, 1150 Seventeenth Street, NW, Suite 510, Washington, DC, 20036.

¹⁴Cited in *Rebuilding America*'s *Defenses*.

level. The proponents, and their interests, of course, would become very rich. It is a classic case of how those with money can have tremendous influence on government and its policies so they can make more money. And the Report was released a year before the September 11th attacks.

Probably the first public awareness of the Report came from Scotland's *Sunday Herald*. Investigative reporter Neil Mackay published an article on 15 September 2002 outlining how George W. Bush and his cabinet had planned a "regime change" in Iraq even before Bush was elected president. ¹⁵ Mackay's article actually revealed a secret plan for US global domination.

This secret blueprint calls for "maintaining global US pre-eminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests." The document indicates that while the US military presence in the Middle East transcends the goal of ousting Saddam Hussein, the unresolved issues with Iraq provide the immediate justification for the buildup of forces. Beyond the Middle East, the secret plan calls for the US to be able to "fight and win as rapidly and decisively as possible, multiple, nearly simultaneous major theater wars."

The blatancy of this report is astounding. It refers to US forces abroad as "the cavalry on the new American frontier" and supports an earlier document by Wolfowitz and Libby which said the US must "discourage advanced industrial nations from challenging our leadership or even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." Mackay listed other issues addressed in the report, which:

- Points to key allies like the UK as a means of achieving global leadership.
- Says that peacekeeping missions need US leadership rather than United Nations.
- Shows concern that Europe may rival the US.
- Says that bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will remain indefinitely despite indigenous opposition.
- Indicates that Iran may prove a threat to US interests.
- Calls for increased US military presence in southeast Asia.
- Calls for total US dominance of space and cyberspace.
- Hints that the US may consider developing biological weapons -- stating that "advanced forms of biological warfare that can 'target' specific genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool."
- Pinpoints North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Iran as dangerous regimes.²⁰

British Parliamentarian Tam Dalyell blasted this report as "a blueprint for US world domination -- a new world order of their making. These are the thought processes of fantastic Americans who want to control the world."

¹⁵See Mackay, 15 September 2002.

¹⁶Rebuilding America's Defenses, p. iv.

¹⁷*Ibid*, p. 14.

¹⁸*Ibid*, p. 8.

¹⁹Cited in Mackay, 15 September 2002.

²⁰Compiled by and cited in Mackay, 15 September 2002. Having read the report I can verify that Mackay's compilation is accurate.

²¹Cited in Mackay, 15 September 2002.

D. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

So far all of these aspirations to be top gun in the world have been private reports which have no real impact except in an advisory way. But when these ideas of world conquest find their way into official government policy, the world becomes more sinister. That is exactly what happened when President Bush released his national security strategy on 20 September 2002 -- two years after *Rebuilding America's Defenses* was released and one year after the terrorist attack on the US.

Ostensibly because of the "war on terrorism," the 23-page document departs markedly from any security strategy of the past. Nevertheless, it is obvious that this strategy relies heavily on the report entitled *Rebuilding America's Defenses*.

The new strategy paper proclaims that "US national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests." What values are referred to are uncertain, but the national interests are unmistakably business interests. And that international opinion will not get in the way of those interests is also unmistakable. The strategy paper states that "we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require." ²³

Under the guise of fighting terrorism, Bush's national security strategy takes on a more aggressive tone, stating that "we recognize that our best defense is a good offense." Bush embraces an aggressive preemptive attack against enemies perceived to have the technology to threaten the US: "And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are formed." Later in the report it gets more specific: "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country ..." Preemption is woven all through the strategy document. As part of the comprehensive strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction, the document reads: "We must deter and defend against the threat before it is released." And "the United States can no longer rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past.... We cannot let our enemies strike first."

The strategy paper continues: "The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction -- and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." It seems quite clear that the US has adopted a public and announced first-strike policy. It wasn't long after that national security

 $^{^{22}\}mbox{National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 3.}$

²³*Ibid*, p. 23.

²⁴*Ibid*, p. 6.

²⁵*Ibid*, p. 1.

²⁶*Ibid*, p. 6.

²⁷*Ibid*, p. 10.

²⁸*Ibid*, p. 11.

²⁹*Ibid*, p. 11.

strategy document was released that we saw the full ramifications of this newly announced aggressive doctrine.

II. PREEMPTIVE FORCE

Preemption, or First Strike, as a national strategy has been suggested and implied for decades but with little public favor. In the cold war days there was once proposed a nuclear strategy called "Preventive Deterrence," which had nothing at all to do with deterrence because it implied a first strike. Much of the writing I have done over the past 30 years has been to show that the US has a clandestine first-strike policy. It is what Paul Nitze termed the "action policy," as opposed to an announced policy which is geared toward political and psychological effects. Fortunately, this covert preemptive nuclear strategy was never used in the nuclear sense.

But, as has been discussed above, neo-conservatives have for a long time viewed Iraq as the first step in their plan for world domination. The September 11th attack provided the opportunity to put that plan into action.

A. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM -- THE FIRST STEP

After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, President Bush declared war on terrorism. Paul Wolfowitz and others in his camp urged Bush to make Iraq the first step in that war. But Secretary of State Colin Powell urged otherwise. According to Washington Post reporter Dan Balz, "Powell's view was that Wolfowitz was fixated on Iraq, that he was looking for any excuse to bring Iraq into this." Powell won that round but Iraq was just postponed, not forgotten.

Nevertheless, on 17 September 2001, just six days after the 9-11 attack, Bush signed a policy document outlining the Afghanistan war plan. But at the end of the document was added a note instructing the Pentagon to start looking at military options for invading Iraq. According to *Washington Post* reporter Glenn Kessler, who broke this story, this "is characteristic of an internal decision-making process that has been obscured from public view."³¹

Code-named "Operation Enduring Freedom," Bush insisted his war on terror was aimed at rooting out Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization which were blamed for the September 11th attacks. The president threatened any country that harbored international terrorists associated with the attack on America. After the Afghanistan operation was completed, Bush started calling for a regime change in Iraq to disarm Saddam Hussein and remove him from power. Justification for this entire operation hinges exclusively on allegations that (a) the Iraqi regime is a security threat to the United States because Saddam has weapons of Mass destruction and (b)the Iraq government supports international terrorists connected with 9-11.

Bush has tried hard to support those two allegations. During his State-of-the-Union address in January 2002, Bush included Iraq as part of the "axis of evil" along with Iran and North Korea -- countries who could supply international terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. Then in June 2002, during his address at West Point, Bush alluded to his preemptive strategy: "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long." Then on 12 September 2002 Bush indicated that he had adopted the entire strategy of world domination, and implied that Iraq was only

³⁰Cited in Carnegie Endowment Proliferation Brief.

³¹Kessler.

³²Cited in Puzzanghera.

the first step. He said: "The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world."³³ To accomplish this so-called "democracy domino theory," regime change in Iraq is only the beginning. On the 20th of September Bush released his new National Security Strategy.

At this point Bush started experiencing domestic and international pressure -- domestic pressure to seek authorization from Congress before attacking Iraq, and international pressure to work through the UN. Secret evidence persuaded Congress in early October to back Bush. In November the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution calling for Iraq to disarm. New weapons inspections began amid controversy and yielded inconclusive results.

In early 2003 the US tried for a second UN resolution that would authorize force against Iraq. Secretary of State Powell presented much "evidence" which was supposed to support US claims. But when the Bush administration, after much behind the scenes "persuasion," saw that a second resolution would fail, the US dropped the issue and decided to go after Iraq unilaterally. The thinking seemed to be that it would be more palatable overall -- to both domestic and international opinion -- to attack Iraq without any UN resolution than with a failed resolution. Britain would supply troop support, Spain logistic support, and Australia moral support. On 20 March 2003 the first salvo was fired signaling the invasion of Iraq -- euphemistically dubbed "Operation Iraqi Freedom."

To examine the various aspects of this war, I will start with the two allegations being used to justify a unilateral and preemptive strike -- (1) Iraq is a threat to the security of the United States and (2) Iraq is connected with Al Qaida which is presumed responsible for the attack on America.

1. Is Iraq a Security Threat to the United States?

The Bush administration claims Iraq has weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- nuclear, chemical, and biological -- which could be true in regards to chemical and biological, considering Saddam's past usage of those weapons. But there had been found no credible proof of an existing stockpile. Yet, President Bush said there is "clear evidence of peril" and "we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.... We have every reason to assume the worst and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from happening."³⁴

A little drama unfolded during hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. On 3 October 2002, Senator Bob Graham, chairman of the committee, tore into CIA Director George Tenet for withholding information Congress needed to know to assess if military action is prudent. Graham blasted the previously-provided CIA report as deficient. It lacked critical information of whether or not Saddam has WMDs and how he would react if attacked.

Tenet relented and a declassified version of the CIA estimate on Iraq's nuclear weapons was sent to the committee, along with a letter from Tenet to Graham dated 7 October 2002. The letter summarized the conclusions in the report:

Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW [chemical-biological weapons] against the United States.

Should Saddam conclude that a US-led attack could no longer be deterred, he probably wold become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions. Such terrorism might involve conventional means, as with Iraq's unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or CBW.

³³Cited in Carnegie Endowment Proliferation Brief.

³⁴Speech by President George W. Bush at the Cincinnati Museum Center in Ohio, 7 October 2002. Cited in Mackay, 13 October 2002.

Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.³⁵

In his letter, Tenet also allowed declassification of certain testimony the week before (2 October 2002) which also illustrated the CIA viewpoint that Saddam would not use WMD unless he were attacked.

Senator Levin: ... If (Saddam) did not feel threatened, is it likely that he would

initiate an attack using weapons of mass destruction?

Senior Intelligence Witness: ... My judgment would be that the probability of him initiating

an attack -- let me put a time frame on it -- in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood

I think would be low.

Senator Levin: Now if he initiated an attack you've ... indicated he would

probably attempt clandestine attacks against us ... But what about use of weapons of mass destruction? If we initiate an attack and he thought he was in extremis or otherwise, what's the likelihood in response to our attack that he would use

chemical or biological weapons?

Senior Intelligence Witness: Pretty high, in my view.³⁶

The official opinion of the CIA is that Saddam would not use chemical or biological weapons and, therefore, is not a security threat to the United States on that score. But, if he is attacked, the CIA feels sure he will use those weapons.

In its Key Judgments section, the CIA report does say, of course, that "Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort and energized its missile program." With regard to biological weapons, the report alludes to investing more heavily. And the nuclear weapons program is described as being "reconstituted." Actually, as pointed out later in the report, Saddam's present nuclear program is merely one of intention.

In spite of this compelling evidence that there is no security threat to the US, documents touted as "secret" evidence were used to gain congressional backing for the administration's warmaking plans. The House of Representatives authorized Bush to use force by a vote 296-133, the Senate did so 77-23.

On 19 March 2003, just two days before the first shots were fired, members of the United Nations Security Council declared that Iraq is not an imminent threat and could be peacefully disarmed. On 5 April 2003, during the third week of war, and after US and British troops have been scouring the countryside of Iraq for proof, British Home Secretary David Blunkett confessed that no chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons may be found after all. If that is true it deals a serious blow to the moral legitimacy of the war.

³⁵Tenet letter, 7 October 2002.

 $^{^{36}}Ibid.$

³⁷Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, page 1.

In summary, the Director of Central Intelligence has testified that Saddam Hussein is not a threat in the foreseeable future. Even if he has chemical weapons, is stepping up work on biological weapons, and desires to obtain nuclear weapons, there is no reason to go to war. We cannot be justified in such an aggressive act just because Saddam is a bad guy and had terrible weapons. No, to justify an attack on Iraq, Saddam must be a threat to the security of the United States. Our top intelligence official says he isn't.

2. Is Iraq Connected to the International Terrorists Who Attacked the US?

George W. Bush and his administration have persistently claimed that Saddam has connections with Al Qaida. Bush has put Iraq on his list of states which sponsor international terrorism. So far no credible proof has been presented. It is not enough to show that Saddam harbors terrorists and uses terrorist tactic, which he probably does. To justify a war on these grounds, Iraq must be connected with Al Qaida or international terrorists who planned and carried out an attack on America.

The proof offered is contacts between Iraq and Osama bin Laden's organization. These did happen but they were never successful in forming an alliance. Yossef Bodansky, director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, devotes parts of two chapters of his book on this topic. I will paraphrase a little from those chapters.³⁸

What Bodansky calls the Talibanization of Pakistan -- transforming Pakistan into a harsh, fundamentalist regime run by the Taliban in Afghanistan -- reached a crescendo in late 1998. It supplied the climate for solidifying the Islamist³⁹ movement. Osama bin Laden emerged as not only a key leader but also a charismatic hero who was able to drum up deep, grass roots support for the most horrible of terrorist activities. Strategic planning for the next step for the global Islamist network was begun. In late October 1998 Qusay Hussein, Saddam's son, sent a representative to Kabul to meet with bin Laden and other Islamist leaders. Bodansky cites a well-connected Arab source as saying bin Laden and his guests "laid down the details of the biggest act of cooperation and coordination between the extremist Islamic organizations and Baghdad for confronting the United States, their common enemy." Chemical and biological weapons were explicitly discussed and bin Laden requested Iraq's help in building chemical and biological bombs. According to Bodansky, twelve Iraqi chemical weapons experts went to Afghanistan to work with bin Laden's men.

Early in December Saddam evicted the UN weapons inspection teams. In retaliation (or to detract from his own impeachment hearings), President Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox on 16 December 1998 -- four days of intensive bombardment which included firing 330 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The grass roots rage it generated throughout the Muslim world intensified recruitment and support for bin Laden's operations. Bodansky fills several pages with descriptions of the widespread backlash and angry demonstrations that the attack on Iraq generated. For Saddam Hussein, the prospect of working with bin Laden's terrorist campaign became irresistible.

³⁸See Bodansky, chapters 12 and 13.

³⁹I use the term "Islamist" (as distinct from Islamic) as reference to a follower of the extremist, fundamentalist form of Islam. In other words, a militant Muslim terrorist.

⁴⁰Bodansky, page 345.

Immediately after the bombing, Saddam dispatched his emissary to Afghanistan to meet with bin Laden. He offered to share Iraqi intelligence information and to provide hospitality for bin Laden and his followers. Iraqi intelligence officers were also sent to Afghanistan and soon four teams of 12 seasoned terrorists each were chosen for further training in a barracks outside Baghdad.

Saddam was uneasy, however. He offered complete support for Islamist operations so long as no Islamist revolution would be started in Iraq throughout this jihad. Saddam was assured that his regime would be safe while he was participating in the jihad. Kuwait intelligence confirmed in January 1999 that hundreds of terrorists were training in southern Iraq. Saddam even had his son, Qusay, who was head of the special security forces, form an Iraqi terrorist force to cooperate on joint operations. It was called Al-Nida (The Call) and was to consist of thousands of fighters specially trained for special operations and guerrilla warfare tactics.

That was as far as Bodansky went. He finished his book in the spring of 1999 so he only related the initial stage of contacts between bin Laden and Saddam. Because of his position in government, I would assume it is pretty much the official story. But even though things looked like they were coming together at that point, more recent reports, which I will soon discuss, indicate there was a falling out.

The US, of course, is still trying to show that connections still exist between bin Laden and Saddam. In his 7 October 2002 letter to Senator Graham (discussed above), CIA director George Tenet outlined several points which could be used for unclassified discussion regarding terrorist links. He started out by saying: "Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and Al Qaida is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we receive comes from detainees, including some of high rank." Evolving knowledge from sources of varying reliability doesn't sound like hard evidence of an international terrorist link with Iraq. The most direct point referring to the present time was: "Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of Al Qaida members , including some that have been in Baghdad." He gives none of the "solid evidence" and doesn't say why they may have been there. Since the statement refers to events that happened after the attack on Afghanistan, there might have been some who fled in that direction for their own safety. Tenet then outlines three other points using the past tense and which are likely true, as has been discussed above:

- "We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaida *going* back a decade."
- "Credible information indicates that Iraq and Al Qaida *have* discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression."
- "We have credible reporting that Al Qaida leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq *has* provided training to Al Qaida members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs."

I have added the emphases in the above paragraph to highlight the past tense. The events described probably did happen in the past, as discussed above. All of these points together sound very convincing unless one reads them carefully and pays close attention to the grammar. As a whole, they don't really prove any current global terrorist connections to Iraq.

British and French officials are far less convinced. On 21 January 2003 British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in an audience with the heads of Parliament's select committees, was asked if there is

⁴¹All quotes in this paragraph are from Tenet letter, 7 October 2002.

"any link between Al Qaida, Iraq and terrorists groups in Britain." Blair's unusually simple answer was "No." This is significant, if true, because Bin Laden's organization has a very pronounced presence in Britain. Back in 1998 the London-based Islamist newspaper, *Al-Quds al Arabi*, was reporting on the overtures between Saddam and bin Laden. But when asked if the US government knows of any link the Prime Minister evaded having to agree with Bush administration claims by saying: "I've said what I said and I don't think I can add to it."

Scottish investigative reporter Neil Mackay writes: "Try as it might, the UK has been unable to produce any evidence clearly linking Saddam to bin Laden, and the French have positively ruled out any connection." Mackay then refers to France's leading terrorist investigator -- an investigative magistrate with access to all of France's intelligence material, much of which is passed on to the CIA and FBI -- who claims that years of investigating Islamist groups have revealed no links to Iraq. The investigator says: "We have not found any link between Al Qaida and Iraq. Not a trace. There is no foundation to our investigations for the information given by the Americans."

This all boils down to that, at one time there were advances and experiments by both parties to reach some type of cooperative agreement. That experiment was apparently not successful. As Mackay expresses it, "the secular nature of Saddam's regime deters him from getting into bed with the likes of bin Laden [who advocates overthrow of such regimes in favor of Islamic governments]. It also makes cosying up to Saddam anathema to the fundamentalists of Al Qaida."⁴⁸ There has been no intelligence linking Saddam with Al Qaida, or the attack on America, and that void isn't because of lack of searching.

3. Seeking Legitimacy To Attack Iraq.

Nevertheless, once the Bush administration decided the time was right to preemptively attack Iraq, there was a deluge of official statements about Iraq not complying with UN Security Council resolutions by continuing its weapons of mass destruction programs and links to the terrorist attack on the US. By October 2002 there were charges that the administration was using only intelligence information that suited its purpose, and was discarding what didn't. In an investigative article on how information is being skewed, the San Jose, California *Mercury News* interviewed over a dozen intelligence officials, many of them at higher levels in the administration. Speaking under protection of anonymity, one senior official pointed out that analysts at the working level "are feeling very strong pressure from the Pentagon to cook the intelligence books." None of those interviewed disagreed with that statement.

⁴²Cited in Carr.

⁴³See Bodansky, pages 360-361.

⁴⁴Carr.

⁴⁵Mackay, 13 October 2002.

⁴⁶Mackay refers to this investigative magistrate as Jean-Louis Bruguiεt#143;re, possibly a code name.

⁴⁷Cited in Mackay, 13 October 2002.

⁴⁸Mackay, 13 October 2002.

⁴⁹Cited in Strobel, Landay, and Walcott.

As an example, they cited Rumsfeld's 26 September 2002 statement that he had "bullet proof" evidence that Saddam was working with Al Qaida and "solid evidence" that international terrorists maintain an office in Iraq. The officials interviewed connected that statement with a telephone call intercepted when an Al Qaida member was travelling through Baghdad and called a friend or relative. Nothing in that call showed that terrorists were working with Saddam's government.

These officials also pointed to Rumsfeld's statement that Saddam had offered safe haven to bin Laden and other Al Qaida and Taliban officials. Technically true but it was made by an Iraqi official visiting Afghanistan in 1998 after the cruise missile bombing of terrorist camps. Rumsfeld didn't cite other information in the same intelligence report that bin Laden rejected the offer because he didn't want to be under Saddam's control.

All of these officials agreed that Saddam would eventually have to be dealt with, possibly with military action, but they say "the US government has no dramatic new knowledge about the Iraqi leader that justifies Bush's urgent call to arms." ⁵⁰

In his September 2002 speech to the United Nations, President Bush used the attempted purchase of thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes to illustrate Saddam's "continued appetite" for nuclear bombs -- saying they were to be "used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon." This claim that material was being sought for a uranium-enrichment centrifuge was investigated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and found to be wanting. The IAEA concluded that "Iraq had indeed been running a secret procurement operation, but the intended beneficiary was not Iraq's Atomic Energy Commission, but rather an established army program to replace Iraq's aging arsenal of conventional 81 mm rockets, the type used in multiple rocket launchers." During the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, Iraq had built tens of thousands of these rockets. They were made from Aluminum-7000 tubes purchased abroad. After the 1991 Gulf war, UN inspectors allowed Saddam to keep 160,000 of these rockets. They were inspected in December 2002 -- aging and corroding after years of outdoor storage.

The thousands of tubes being clandestinely purchased were also made of 7000-series aluminum, and measured 81 mm diameter and about a meter in length -- the quantities and specifications were exactly right for the decades-old rocket program. The diameter, metal thickness and anodized coating were not what would be used for centrifuges. The only suspicious feature was the close tolerances specified for dimensions. A nuclear expert familiar with the program said: "It may be technically possible that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium. But you'd have to believe that Iraq deliberately ordered the wrong stock and intended to spend a great deal of time and money reworking each piece." David Albright, a former IAEA inspector, said it appeared the Iraqis were "trying to buy exact replacements for those rockets." Furthermore, according to US and international officials, there is no evidence to date that Iraq is trying to buy motors, metal caps, special magnets, and other materials required for centrifuges.⁵³

US Secretary of State Colin Powell on 5 February 2003 presented to the UN Security Council what was advertised to be detailed intelligence information on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction

⁵⁰Strobel, Landay, and Walcott.

⁵¹Cited in Warrick, 23 January 2003..

⁵²Warrick, 23 January 2003.

⁵³All citations and information in this paragraph are from Warrick, 23 January 2003.

programs and their links to terrorism.⁵⁴ The hour-and-a-half presentation, accompanied by 45 visual-aid slides, was replete with the phrase "we know" punctuated periodically with "our sources tell us" or "we have evidence" or some such phrase which provides no hard evidence but implores the listeners to trust his word. The narrative form of Powell's presentation conjured up a sinister plot of deception which gripped the attention the millions of people to which it was broadcast.

The only material evidence actually submitted were satellite photos of previously known weapons facilities and audio tapes of intercepted conversations between high level authorities. Powell's elaboration and explanation of each led the audience to the conclusion he suggested. There was no evidence which could not have been adjusted or interpreted in such a way as to meet the Bush administration's agenda. The areas Powell covered are biological weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, weapons delivery systems, and connections to terrorists. He sums up his speech with a long dissertation on Iraq's human rights abuses to remind everyone of what a bad guy Saddam really is.

It is not my intention here to prove that Saddam does not have weapons of mass destruction. He very well could have chemical weapons and possibly biological weapons. Again, the purpose here is to show that Powell presented no convincing evidence that Saddam is an immediate threat to the United States or that he has links to terrorists that attacked the United States. I will address each of the areas Powell covered.

<u>Biological Weapons.</u> Powell started this section by dramatically pointing out that Saddam declared 8,500 liters of anthrax but UN inspectors believe he **could** have produced 25,000 liters. That sounds pretty threatening but Powell had indicated two paragraphs previously, in an innocuous statement, that Saddam's admission took place in 1995. That was when weapons inspections were at full activity and those 8,500 liters had to be destroyed per UN Resolution 687. Additional stores

of anthrax were never found and Powell introduced no new evidence that proved what UN inspectors thought **could** have happened..

Then, in an impressive reference to "the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons," Powell says the most worrisome thing in it is the existence of mobile production facilities for biological agents. He then gave his version of what four unnamed sources told the US about production units in road trailers or rail cars. From these sources were made drawings of what road-mobile and rail-mobile biological weapons laboratories would look like. Those drawings were presented to the Security Council as Slide 20 of his presentation. Based on these drawings,



Slide 20

⁵⁴Powell Speech, 5 February 2003.

there seems to be no significant satellite-detectable differences for these vehicles than from most any other vehicle.

This alleged second-hand evidence took up two pages of transcript that elaborated on circumspect topics and things "we know" but told nothing of substance about actual existence of these units. Yet this seemed to be the central issue in his presentation on biological weapons. He summarized that section with the rhetorical statement: "There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction." ⁵⁵

Chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Bix, disagrees. Bix commented before Powell's speech that he hoped the Secretary was not going to bring up the subject of mobile biological weapons laboratories because there is no evidence they exist. His team had already checked two suspected mobile labs. One turned out to be a truck equipped to test the quality of food production. The other was a fire engine standing by for safety reasons. Bix pointed out that the idea of mobile biological laboratories had been around for some time and that he had followed up on US leads to no avail.

<u>Chemical Weapons.</u> Powell introduces this section with a chilling rerun of how Saddam has used these weapons in the past during the war with Iran and on his own Kurdish population. These are all well known facts as is the understanding that Saddam is a ruthless butcher. But they do not throw any light on if he has a current stockpile and, if so, how big it is.

Then Powell said that Saddam has never declared 550 artillery shells with mustard gas, 30,000



Slide 13

empty munitions, and enough resources to increase his stockpile to 500 tons of chemical agents. The exact figures sound impressive. They are followed by a gory description of what chemical weapons do to the human body and then, again, proven evidence of Iraq's possession of such weapons in the past. This was followed by assertions prefaced by "we believe," "we have evidence," and "we know."

Powell's material proof of chemical weapons production was in the form of satellite photos. In the left half of Slide 13 he showed a building labeled a chemical weapons plant which had been sanitized by bulldozing all

around the outside area. This photo, he said, was typical of 65 locations.

The right side of Slide 13 showed UN vehicles approaching sanitized bunkers, as if it were actually possible to remove all traces of producing chemical weapons for years. He also told the Security Council that a human source verified that chemical weapons had been moved from this location. Because the photo itself could have been taken anywhere, or touched up, Powell explained "its not just the photo, and it's not an individual seeing the photo. It's the photo and then the

⁵⁵Washington File, 5 February 2003, page 13.

knowledge of the individual being brought together to make the case."⁵⁶ So once again, the case being made depends on believing what he is saying. That is not solid proof.

The remainder of Powell's presentation on chemical weapons followed the same pattern as before -- an audio tape alleged to be the conversation between two Iraqi Republican Guard commanders, gruesome eyewitness accounts of prisoners being tied to their beds as guinea pigs for chemical weapons, intimations of what a few empty 122 mm rocket shells could have been intended for. Powell also gives his "conservative estimate" of Iraq's chemical stockpile today -- 100-500 tons of chemical weapons agent, the lower end of which could cause 16,000 battlefield deaths. His presentation was dramatic. It raised emotions. But it was lacking in factual proof.

<u>Nuclear Weapons.</u> In his usual fashion, Secretary Powell started the presentation on Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program with a review of history. Saddam did have a nuclear program at one time but that was brought to a halt. The pertinent question is if he has a nuclear weapons program right now. Powell alluded to an answer by saying that Iraq has two of the three key components required to build a nuclear bomb -- a team of qualified scientists and the plans for making the bomb. All he needs is the material. That is tantamount to having a person knowledgeable about automobiles with a license to drive, but no car.

Powell then indicated how Saddam is trying to acquire that third, critical component. Yet the key evidence along that line that he presented was the much-disputed 81 mm diameter aluminum tubes Saddam had tried to buy (discussed above). Despite so much evidence to the contrary, Powell still tried to convince the Security Council that they were indeed planned for enriching uranium. He called attention to the tight tolerances on dimensions. He said the smooth anodized coating was not necessary if the tubes were to be used for rockets. But for the exposed storage area in which the rockets are stored, anodizing would be an added protection against corrosion. Powell also said Iraq had tried to purchase other parts needed for a centrifuge -- a plant to manufacture the special magnets and machines to balance gas centrifuge rotors. Yet, according to US and international officials just the month before, there is no evidence to date that Iraq is trying to buy any of these things.

Nuclear scientists from Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories accompanied recent inspection teams just prior to the US invasion. They were excited at the opportunity to uncover Saddam's clandestine nuclear weapons programs. But in all their innovative searching they failed to uncover a single clue. They were actually appalled to see the degree of decay of what was once an elaborate nuclear weapons production infrastructure. One UN official summarized the extent of any such program as possibly being "a few guys with paper and pencil and some computer in a back room.." ⁵⁷

Another piece of "evidence" reached public knowledge after Powell's February 5th presentation to the Security Council. It was a series of letters between Iraqi officials and the Central African nation of Niger, purportedly showing that Iraq was trying to buy 500 tons of mined uranium (uranium oxide) a couple years ago. Uranium oxide is Niger's largest export. The letters were reported to have been given to the US by a third country. That country has not been identified. On March 7th (2003), Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told the UN Security Council the documents were crude forgeries with many blatant inconsistencies

⁵⁶Washington File, 5 February 2003, page 15.

⁵⁷Cited in Stober.

and errors. He also told the Security Council that over three months with 218 inspections at 141 sites had produced "no evidence or plausible indication" that Iraq had a nuclear program. The Senate Intelligence Committee requested that the FBI determine the source of the fake documents. Senator Jay Rockefeller said "There is a possibility that the fabrication of these documents may be part of a larger deception campaign aimed at manipulating public opinion and foreign policy regarding Iraq." According to CNN, Powell refered to those documents directly, in his February 5th presentation to the Security Council, as evidence of Iraq's nuclear program. The transcript of that speech now posted on the White House and State Department websites make no mention of those documents or of Iraq trying to buy uranium from Niger. If the CNN report is accurate, that now-proved-false information has been edited out after the fact — after it was proven to be fake. Nevertheless, President Bush did refer to the Niger documents in his 28 January 2003 state-of-the-union address. On 9 March 2003, when asked about the fake documents on NBC's 'Meet The Press,' Powell said: It was the information that we had. We provided it. If the information is inaccurate, fine." Fine? That was evidence used to justify a war! Fine?

<u>Delivery Systems for WMD.</u> Under UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), Iraq is not allowed to have a ballistic missile or other delivery system -- such as a cruise missile or remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) -- with a range in excess of 150 kilometers (93 miles). All of the prohibited missiles were to have been destroyed. Powell said that numerous "intelligence reports" from "sources

inside Iraq" indicates that Saddam still has a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud variant missiles with ranges of 600-900 kilometers (373-559 miles). According to Powell, UN inspectors have reported that Iraq has illegally imported 350 rocket engines that could be used for illegal al-Samud II missiles, some as late as December 2002. He also showed a satellite photo of an engine test stand which he says is designed to test a liquid-fueled engine that will go over 1,200 kilometers (746 miles). Finally, Iraq has a UAV with a declared range of 80 kilometers, but Powell says it has been detected to fly 500 kilometers nonstop without refueling.



Slide 14

Powell addressed suspicious activity at several missile assembly plants as proof of an illegal missile program. He did not say that UN inspection teams now had six of these assembly sites under

⁵⁸Cited in Charbonneau.

⁵⁹Cited in Guggenheim.

⁶⁰See Ensor.

⁶¹Cited in Ensor.

surveillance. In response to Powell's allegation, Iraqi officials subsequently escorted foreign journalists to two of the sites. At the al-Musayyib Rocket Test Facility (Slide 14) on the Euphrates River, 35 miles south of Baghdad, the site director said the shipments photographed were everyday occurrences -- "So any day Colin Powell can claim there is intense activity here." Weapons inspection teams have not reported any violations of UN bans.

The satellite photo of al-Musayyib was taken two weeks before the UN weapons team resumed inspections. The site director told the visiting reporters that shipments of parts and finished missiles go on every day. And that they are all for the al-Fatah missile which is legal. He pointed to a truck similar to the one in the photo parked at the same place. There were also missile canisters and components waiting to be transferred. The al-Musayyib site has been inspected 10 times since the photo was taken in November 2002, and many missiles bore the seals of recent inspections.

<u>Connections to International Terrorists and Al Qaida.</u> The final area that Powell covered in his speech was Iraq's purported connection to Al Qaida and international terrorists responsible for the attack on the United States. After the initial litany of contacts Saddam has had with terrorists in the past, Powell focuses on the point he has to prove in order to legitimize attacking Iraq as part of the war on terror -- that is, a connection of Iraq with Al Qaida.

The only current link that Powell makes is the allegation that a collaborator of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida named Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (sometimes spelled Zakawi) has his headquarters in Iraq. According to Powell, 36-year-old Zarqawi is a Palestinian born in Jordan who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. He returned to Afghanistan in 2000 to oversee a terrorist training camp which specialized in poisons. When the Taliban was ousted from Afghanistan, the Zarqawi network reportedly help establish another poison and explosive training center in northeaster Iraq. Powell then shows a slide which he claims is a satellite view of that camp.

The day after Powell's speech, foreign government officials, terrorist experts, and some members of Congress disputed Powell's claims.

Some senior administration officials interviewed say that Zarqawi does have contacts with bin Laden but is not under Al Qaida control or direction. "They have common goals," says one intelligence analyst. "But he is outside bin Laden's circle. He is not sworn Al Qaida."

This camp is in the northern Kurdish area which was beyond Baghdad's control. But Powell says Saddam had an agent in a most senior level of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam which controls that corner of Iraq. And that it was this group that offered the Islamists safe haven when the Taliban fell, thereby implying that Saddam was connected



Slide 40

⁶²Cited in Associated Press, 7 February 2003.

⁶³Cited in Pincus.

to the Ansar group and this terrorist camp.⁶⁴ But a senior US official denied any direct intelligence knowledge of what this agent did. "He may be spying on the Ansar group, he may be a liaison with Baghdad. Saddam Hussein likes to keep an eye on such groups," the official said.⁶⁵ And regarding the Ansar group, after the camp was captured by US and Kurdish forces, the *Los Angeles Times* reported there was "no strong evidence of connections to Baghdad ... Ansar was not a sophisticated terrorist organization. The group was a dedicated, but fledgling, Al Qaida surrogate lacking the capability to muster a serious threat beyond its mountain borders."⁶⁶

Then Powell tells how Zarqawi went to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical reasons and then started a base of operations there to coordinate the movement of money, people, and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network. He has drawn up a chart (Slide 40) to illustrate the alleged network Zarqawi has built up.

There is also dispute about this assertion. Senior US officials on 6 February 2003 said that although the Iraqi government is aware of the activity, it does not operate, control or sponsor it.⁶⁷ In essence, it is the same as the US government which is aware of terrorist activity in this country but certainly doesn't sponsor it.

Slide 40 also depicts a UK Poison Cell in the Zarqawi network connected to Zarqawi through Abu Hafs in Russia. Also, on 6 February 2003 President Bush said Zarqawi's network "was caught producing poisons in London." Earlier in this paper I quoted British Prime Minister Tony Blair as telling the lead Parliamentarians that Al Qaida has no connections with the UK. If US intelligence does, indeed, have proof of such a connection we can be sure it would have been shared with their British counterparts.

<u>In Summary</u>, there have been a lot of complaints about how the US government puts a spin on intelligence information to serve political purposes. Operatives in both the CIA and M16 (British counterpart of the CIA) believe they are being used for political purposes and that the intelligence they have acquired is being selectively applied. In some cases it is used to imply the opposite conclusion from what the agencies have arrived. One disgruntled British official complained: "You cannot just cherry pick evidence that serves your case and ignore the rest. It is a cardinal rule of intelligence... Yet that is what the [Prime Minister] is doing."

A London newspaper -- *The Independent* -- describes a covert rebellion Prime Minister Blair is facing from his top spies, who "last week used the politician's own weapon -- the strategic leak --

⁶⁴When US and Kurdish troops captured the training camp in March 2003, they found a wealth of documents and computer files that revealed that the group Ansar al Islam, although partly funded and armed from abroad, were no immediate threat to anyone beyond their own mountain borders. They did have aspirations to develop chemical weapons but were organized primarily for a jihad against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan that governed the eastern portion of Kurdish controlled Iraq.

⁶⁵Cited in Pincus.

⁶⁶Fleishman.

⁶⁷Cited in Pincus.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Cited in Lashmar and Whitaker.

against him. The BBC received a Defense Intelligence Staff document which showed that British intelligence believes there are no current links between the Iraq regime and the Al Qaida network." One insider said: "A [Defense Intelligence Staff] document like this is highly secret. Whoever leaked it must have been quite senior and had unofficial approval within the highest levels of British intelligence."

Then it became public that much of the British government's recent dossier on Iraq, claimed to have been derived from intelligence information, was plagiarized from published academic materials, some of which were as much as two years old. It was this very document that Secretary Powell held up before the Security Council during his February 5th presentation, saying: "I would call my colleagues attention to the fine paper that United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities."

On the American side, I have already related how Senator Graham finally wheedled a statement from CIA Director Tenet that Saddam was not an imminent threat to the US. And how a declassified report was finally provided which did not support an invasion of Iraq. There is also an organization of about 25 ex-CIA analysts and officers called Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. They claim that the Bush administration is only using intelligence information that suits its purpose, and ignores what doesn't. Ray McGovern, leader of the group and a 27-year CIA veteran, says intelligence information has "been cooked to a recipe, and the recipe is high policy. That's why a lot of my former colleagues are holding their nose."

Now the US and British forces that have invaded Iraq are scouring the country for weapons of mass destruction and links to Al Qaida. Much to the alarm of the IAEA, the US has set up its own team of disarmament experts and has even tried recruiting the best inspectors from the UN team. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, US intelligence officials had listed over 1,000 suspicious sites for chemical and biological weapons -- 100 or so of them labeled top priority. In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush was very specific about the volume of chemical and biological weapons Saddam was hiding -- 25,000 liters of anthrax, 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 500 tons of mustard and nerve gases. But even with all that alleged intelligence information, and after searching 80 of the top 100 high priority sites -- including mosques, homes, factories, and government ministries -- the US had uncovered no proof of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction. Nothing has been found except some residual evidence that Iraq at one time did have a WMD program. We all know that. That knowledge is not a threat to our national security. Yet, although the invasion was justified by the Bush administration's flat declaration that it had knowledge of WMD's existence, so far there has been found no proof of that claim. There is still no justification for launching the war.

UN inspectors were chagrined that the US would not share enough intelligence with them so they could inspect those suspicious sites. Then the UN teams were forced out when hostilities began. Now US military teams are doing the searching. But with the deception that has so far been exercised

⁷⁰Lashmar and Whitaker.

⁷¹Cited in Lashmar and Whitaker.

⁷²Powell Speech, 5 February 2003, Page 8. Apparently the word "yesterday" in this quote is incorrect. The UK document was released earlier than "yesterday," and that word was omitted when *The Independent* quoted Powell's phrase.

⁷³Cited in Lumpkin.

by the Bush administration, if evidence of a current WMD program is ever found, its authenticity will need multinational verification to be credible proof. Nevertheless, the US refuses to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq, saying the country is still too dangerous and that the US will handle the situation itself.

There is also concern that fake evidence will be planted. On 17 April 2003 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said there will be no chance of planting evidence. He said the search teams will have people with them to validate things, "they will have the ability to take pictures, and to make sure that the control over any piece of evidence is as clear as it possibly can be." That will still be a closed loop and it could still all be fabricated. Retired CIA analyst Ray McGovern said: "Even if the planting was discovered, they'll say 'OK, the weapons were planted'." People will gripe and complain for a while but nothing will be done about it.

The New York Times reported on 21 April 2003 that a search team from the 101st Airborne Division discovered a scientist who had worked on Iraq's chemical weapons program for over ten years. He gave the whole nine yards of testimony -- Iraq had destroyed some toxic agents in the 1990s and moved some to Syria. Saddam had destroyed chemical and biological weapons equipment before the Americans took over. Recently Iraq was cooperating with Al Qaida. This conveniently-discovered scientist said everything the Bush administration wanted to hear. But US officials would not reveal his name -- it might endanger his safety. The embedded correspondent who wrote the story, Judith Miller, said she was not able to interview the scientist personally although she was able to examine a letter slipped to the military by him, written in Arabic. She was able to observe him from a distance -- baseball cap, nondescript clothes, and all -- but the article she wrote, when it was finally released, had certain specifics censored from it. Again we have the "Trust Me" situation with no UN or third party verification. We just have to take the word of the Bush administration. Unfortunately, the credibility of that word has worn thin.

Whether the discovered scientist actually exists or has been conjured up as a propaganda ploy, the Bush administration now realizes that the list of sites is of no value. It has now changed tack regarding the search. According to "embedded" reporting, rather than looking for the weapons themselves, the search teams will scour the country for more scientists, officials, and documents that will prove existence of the weapons immediately prior to the invasions. This may be an easier way out of the illusive weapons dilemma than planting evidence. But even if Iraqi scientists are found who can be convinced or bribed to testify that the weapons were destroyed very recently, such testimony would still challenge logic. Saddam was a master at brinkmanship and deception but he was also a pragmatist. When the chips were down, he would sacrifice lesser issues to assure his survival in power. In that sense, the alleged destruction does not make sense. If WMDs existed why wouldn't Saddam declare them when he was in a corner and allow UN inspectors to confirm the disarmament? That would be more in character than to give Bush and Blair the satisfaction of seeing a regime change just to hide the fact that he actually had the weapons?

The propaganda experts are preparing public opinion right now for failure to find credible evidence that WMDs recently existed. Disappearance of those critical records is being blamed on looters. Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy, stated in late April that "some of the

⁷⁴Quotations in this paragraph cited in Agence France Presse, 18 April 2003.

⁷⁵Miller, 21 April 2003.

⁷⁶See Miller, 22 April 2003.

looting is actually strategic." He said former Baath Party and Iraqi government officials appear to be "doing at least some of the looting" of government facilities "including those that might have records or materials relating to weapons of mass destruction."

4. Addressing the Legality of Attacking Iraq.⁷⁸

The United Nations Charter is an international treaty. The United States has signed and ratified the UN Charter which makes it binding under the US Constitution which states that, in addition to the Constitution and laws passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land..." Therefore, the United States is legally bound by the United Nations Charter. With that in mind, let us look at what the UN Charter does.

Article 2 of the UN Charter states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 80

The "Purposes of the United Nations" are spelled out in Article 1, which are (1) to maintain international peace and security, (2) to develop friendly relations among nations, and (3) to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems. In essence, the UN Charter outlaws war but does leave room for exceptions in the case of self-defense. That is why the Bush administration tried so hard to show that Iraq was a threat to America's national security. Consequently, if there is no evidence found of that security threat (i.e. no evidence of weapons of mass destruction discovered), the use of force against Iraq was a violation of Article 2 of the UN Charter and the Bush administration has committed an international crime.

But there is also a fourth Purpose of the United Nations, which is: "To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." That is why the Bush administration tried so hard to get another UN resolution authorizing the use of force. Resolution 1441 (8 November 2002) does not do that. It only holds Iraq in material breach of disarmament and threatens "serious consequences." In legal language that does not even imply authorization for force because of a security threat. For a Security council resolution to authorize the use of armed force, it must contain the phrase "all necessary means" to be used to uphold the resolution. When it became apparent that another resolution was not possible, the administration determined it would be better to not have any new resolution than to have one that had been vetoed.

⁷⁷Cited in Gellman, 22 April 2003.

⁷⁸ For this section I owe much gratitude to George Farebrother of the UK World Court Project and his colleagues at the Institute for Law and Peace (London) for their critical legal review and valuable corrections.

⁷⁹United States Constitution, Article VI.

⁸⁰United Nations Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 4.

⁸¹ Ibid, Article 1, Paragraph 4.

⁸²The penalty clause of Resolution 1441 is Paragraph 13 which states: "*Recalls*, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations." The term "in that context" refers to the preceding Paragraph 12 which indicates that, in the case of further non-cooperation or deception by Iraq, a further evaluation by the Council is required to decide if "serious consequences" are to be imposed and what they will be.

Now the Bush administration is relying on its legal advisers to twist the language of past resolutions to justify the invasion. William Howard Taft IV, a US State Department advisor, invoked Security Council Resolutions 678 (29 November 1990) and 687 (3 April 1991). He stated: "There is clear authorization from the Security Council to use force to disarm Iraq." He explains that the source of this authority is Resolution 687 which "authorizes member states ... to use *all necessary means* to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area." (Emphasis added) Resolution 660 determined that there was a breach of international peace and security when Iraq invaded Kuwait, demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its forces, and called upon both countries to start negotiations to settle their differences. In short, the use of force authorized in Resolution 678 is only to expel Iraq from Kuwait. None of the resolution up to that point demand that Iraq disarm or declare weapons of mass destruction.

Taft then explains that after Iraqi forces had been removed from Kuwait, the Security Council on 3 April 1991 passed Resolution 687 which added more conditions -- that Iraq disarm and declare all weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq not support international terrorists or allow them to operate within its boundaries. The functional clause in this resolution is:

33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990).⁸⁶

The key words here for a formal cease fire to take effect are "official notification by Iraq" of its "acceptance of the provisions above." It says a formal cease-fire will be in effect at the time of that notification, not when all the provisions have been finally accomplished. Since Iraq has accepted the conditions -- it has declared many times in recent months that it possesses no weapons of mass destruction and does not harbor terrorists -- the formal cease-fire is already in place.

However, Taft states: "Iraq has 'materially breached' these disarmament obligations, and force may again be used under [Resolution] 678 to compel Iraqi compliance." That is simply untrue for two reasons. First, whether in good faith or not, Iraq has already given the official notification and the conditions for a cease-fire have been met. Failure to follow through with that acceptance is another matter for another Security Council decision.

The second reason Taft's statement is untrue is because Resolution 678 only authorized force to remove Saddam from Kuwait, not to force him to disarm.. Resolution 1441 (8 November 2002) properly took note of that material breach of Iraq's obligation and gave one last chance for Saddam to comply (just like Resolution 660 did regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait). The procedure from there would be another resolution authorizing the use of force. That resolution never materialized so there is no Security Council authorization for America's recent invasion of Iraq.

⁸³ Washington File, 21 March 2003.

⁸⁴Resolution 678.

⁸⁵The "subsequent relevant resolutions" are Resolutions 661. 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677. They all pertain to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

⁸⁶Resolution 687.

⁸⁷Washington File, 21 March 2003.

Ruth Wedgewood, professor of international law at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and another Bush administration advisor, tried to use the same arguments as Taft, above. Referring to Resolution 687 she said: "When the general conditions of a cease-fire (destruction of WMD) ceases to be observed, it seems to me that in every real sense ... the cease fire is suspended." There is no provision in Resolution 687 for suspending the cease-fire once it is in place. Paragraph 34 says the Security Council: "Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area." It is obvious that non-compliance requires further action by the Security Council.

In her 14 March 2003 article in *The Financial Times* (London), Wedgewood still hits on the same theme: "Resolution 687 designates Iraq's acceptance of this requirement as a continuing condition of the Gulf War cease-fire." As pointed out above, Iraq's acceptance puts the cease-fire in place, period. Nothing is said about continuing compliance except that the Security Council will remain seized on the matter for any further action required. Wedgewood then mixes up words a little to prove her point. Still trying to show that Resolution 678 (to expel Iraq from Kuwait) authorizes force for subsequent Resolution 687 (demanding Iraq's disarmament), she writes: "Teeth are also supplied by Resolution 678, authorizing the allies to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to use force in support of all 'subsequent relevant resolutions' needed to restore regional peace and security." Wedgewood has resorted to the sin of omission to present information out of context and mislead her readers. Resolution 678 actually supports "Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions." The relevant resolutions are subsequent to 660, not 678 as Wedgewood tries to imply. Resolution 678 actually itemizes all of the "subsequent relevant resolutions."

Some scholars have reached deeper than the Security Council and into the United Nations Charter, itself, to show that the US invasion of Iraq is an international crime. Peter Carter QC, chairman of the Bar human rights committee (Britain), points out that the UN Charter delegates to the Security Council the maintaining of international peace and security. And in doing so, it must act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. So even if the Security Council had been coerced into a new resolution authorizing military force against Iraq, that resolution would not have been legal in the absence of absolute proof that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or was supporting international terrorism.⁹²

Milan Rai of the British NGO, Voices in the Wilderness, brings to mind other requirements binding the Security Council. Article 39 of the Charter specifies that the Security Council is the body that will determine any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. It further tasks the Security Council exclusively with suggesting or deciding what action to take to restore international peace and security. Non-military action is to be taken according to Article 41, and military action according to Article 42.

⁸⁸Cited in Washington File, 9 April 2003.

⁸⁹Resolution 687.

⁹⁰Cited in Washington File, 20 March 2003.

⁹¹*Ibid*.

⁹²See Farebrother and Mcvey, Paper A.

⁹³*Ibid*, Paper C.

Rai further points out that Article 42 lays down two requirements which have to be met before military action can be initiated. First, the Security Council must determine that there is, indeed, a threat to peace or security. Then, and only after a threat has been determined, the Security Council must further determine that non-military action is inadequate.

So, there must first be a threat. Even if it had been proved, which it hadn't, that Saddam had WMDs, that alone would not be justification to initiate armed force. Rai quotes British Vice Admiral Sir James Jungius KBE: "Even if the weapons do exist, where is the evidence of intent to use them?..." Under conditions that existed prior to the invasion of Iraq, if the Security Council had issued a resolution calling for the use of military force, that resolution would have been illegal.

The UN Charter does provide for critical emergency situations. Richard Falk, Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University, illustrates that Article 51 of the Charter allows any member nation to initiate military action in self defense without Security Council authorization if it is in danger of imminent attack. But even then it must be immediately reported to the Security Council and does not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council. Falk points out that "for President Bush claiming a generalized right to wage a preemptive war was in flagrant contradiction with the Charter's legal framework without any special circumstances justifying an exception."

In summary, the US/UK invasion of Iraq was an illegal act of aggression for several reasons:

- Both the US and UK have ratified the UN Charter and are thus bound by its provisions.
- There had been no conclusive evidence presented that Iraq had violated Security Council resolutions by recently conducting a program to produce weapons of mass destruction, or that Saddam had been recently supporting international terrorism. His violations centered around not cooperating with weapons inspectors.
- Even if Saddam had WMDs, proven or unproven, there was still no threat to international security.
- Even if a specific threat to international security did exist -- such as a known WMD production site or a terrorist cell supported by Saddam's regime -- options other than military force would still have had to been proven ineffective.
- There was no immediate threat to justify an exception to going through the Security Council before applying military force.
- Even if an exception had existed, the US and UK did not immediately report it to the Security Council for further UN action. In fact, the Security Council has been systematically excluded from any decision making.

Based on the above discussion, the recent invasion of Iraq is contrary to decisions of the Security Council and in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter. As such, military action by the US and UK is, in itself, an act of aggression which constitutes an international crime.

B. POST-WAR PLANS -- ESTABLISHING A "DEMOCRATIC" IRAQ.

There is a big turf battle presently going on within the Bush administration over what department will run things in post-Saddam Iraq. On one side is Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

⁹⁴Published in a letter to *The Times* (London, 1 January 2003). Cited in Farebrother and Mcvey, Paper C.

⁹⁵Cited in Farebrother and Mcvey, Paper B.

and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, backed by Vice President Dick Cheney. On the other is Secretary of State Colin Powell. Although Congress has backed Powell in this power struggle, it seems to be the neo-conservatives who are getting their way.

There is also strong friction between the Bush administration and other members of the UN. Although the US has consistently said that the UN and other countries will have a place in the rehabilitation of Iraq, the place assigned seems to be mainly providing money and humanitarian relief. The profitable and decision-making aspects of reconstruction have so far been controlled by the US. Those aspects are (1) setting up a "democratic" civilian government with some perception of autonomy, (2) reconstruction of the infrastructure, and (3) developing the oil fields.

1. Establishing "Democracy" -- A Civilian Government.

The Bush administration asserts that the US will stay in Iraq as long as it is necessary, but not one day longer. That is a pretty open-ended commitment. It is the United States, of course, that will decide how long is necessary. Although that necessary length of time is only supposed to be what is needed to set up a representative civilian government, I believe we can rest assured that the "democracy" to be set up will suit US interests.

Furthermore, as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz spelled out on 6 April 2003, the UN will have no role in setting up Iraq's interim government. President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair defined the UN's "vital" role as humanitarian aid, fund raising, and passing resolutions to "endorse" the postwar administration of Iraq. Bush also allowed that the UN could make suggestions about putting together Iraq's interim government.

Plans outlined for eventually obtaining a representative government contain three steps. First to be established is a Civil Administration to work in conjunction with the Military Authority. Next comes an Interim Authority headed by an Iraqi appointed by the United States. Initially, so the plans say, this Interim Authority will also work with the Military Authority. The third step is a little hazy and is simple described as a transition to representative government. As Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, expressed it, "our goal is to transfer as much authority as possible, as soon as possible, to the Iraqis themselves."

<u>Civil Administration</u> -- Iraq is presently under a Military Authority commanded by US General Tommy Franks. ⁹⁷ To plan for the post-Saddam government, the Defense Department has created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, also under General Franks. This move is more than a gesture of humanitarian good will. Under international law the belligerent "occupying" power must provide for the humanitarian needs of an occupied country or arrange for the proper agencies to do so. ⁹⁸ The US is using two ruses to sidestep that obligation.

⁹⁶Feith.

 $^{^{97}}$ General Tommy Franks is commander of the Central Command (CENTCOM) with headquarters in Qatar on the Persian Gulf region.

⁹⁸The Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, both of which are binding on the US, form the general basis for the laws of war. It is from these international treaties that the US Army's "Law of Land Warfare" (1956) has been transcribed. But because the US does not recognize or participate in the International Court of Criminal Justice, these treaties may only have a morally binding effect.

FIRST, the Bush administration claims that the "occupation" phase hasn't taken effect yet because the war is not over. In his 1 May 2003 speech announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq, Bush meticulously avoided declaring the war over. He actually made a point of saying that the war is still going on and will continue for a long time. Nevertheless, it is evident that forces are being scaled back. Three of the four aircraft carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf have been relieved of war duty. Two of the three Marine Expeditionary Units (2,200 people each) that fought in Iraq are in the process of returning home -- apparently being replaced by normal Army units. These events undoubtably contributed to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 24 April 2003 calling on the US-UK coalition to respect international law as the occupying force. Citing the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1949 geneva Conventions, Annan said: "I hope the coalition will set an example by making clear that they intend to act strictly within the rules" governing occupations.

SECOND the Bush administration claims that the coalition is a liberation force, not occupation force. This twisting of semantics introduces an interesting conundrum. The Geneva and Hague Conventions which spell out the rules of war contain no such category as a "liberating force."

In spite of their disclaimers, the Bush administration says it is meeting the treaty responsibilities anyway, which is only partially true. On 20 January 2003 Bush directed the Defense Department to set up the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Its major role is to enlist the proper UN agencies and non-governmental organizations to take care of the Iraqi people. But because the Bush administration has so far refused to allow the UN any key role, and due to Europe's spiteful feelings over America invading Iraq without UN approval, there has been very little success in enlisting outside aid. ¹⁰¹ The burden has so far fallen completely on US and British shoulders. That certainly must be the reason Bush administration officials are hesitant to declare the war over and move into the occupation phase.

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is headed by retired US Army Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner. Besides defense officials, the Office includes representatives from other cabinet and administrative offices. In addition to coordinating humanitarian relief, Garner's office is also tasked with setting up a Civil Administration to run the non-military operations immediately after the occupation of Iraq.

Garner and his group arrived in Iraq during April 2003. Seen by many as a modern day Viceroy, General Garner plans to reside in the Republican Palace, Saddam's former main habitat. The Civil Administration consists of many former ambassadors and other officials from previous US administrations who will oversee new ministries being set up in Iraq to replace the 23 that were under Saddam's Baath party. With a retired three-star general at its head, this implied "civilian" Civil Administration is certain to coordinate well with the Military Authority.

⁹⁹An aircraft carrier is accompanied by about ten other fighting and support ships. All of them together form a battle group.

¹⁰⁰Cited in Fowler.

¹⁰¹One exception seems to be Italy which in late April 2003 announced it would send 2,500-3,000 troops to Iraq to take part in such operations as humanitarian aid, convoy escort, railway and infrastructure rebuilding, unexploded ordnance control, and chemical operations.

¹⁰² Some designated ministry overseers are Margaret Tutwiler, former ambassador and a State Department spokeswoman under Bush Sr., will handle public relations for the Civil Administration; Barbara Bodine, former envoy to Yemen, is in charge of central Iraq and has a job loosely referred to as "The Mayor of Baghdad"; Robert Reilly, former head of the Voice of America radio station; and Timothy Carney who served in Sudan. The candidate to run the Information Ministry is James Woolsey, former CIA director and member of the Defense Policy Board.

At first it appeared that the Defense Department, with its neo-conservative backing, had won the turf battle with Powell's State Department. That may not be the case. On 2 May 2003, in what was seen as shifting the victory to the State Department, *The New York Times* published an article, and sent a wire dispatch to newspapers throughout the nation, that the White House intended to appoint a high-level civilian to head the Civil Administration to replace retired General Garner. It is expected that L. Paul Bremer, counterterrorism director during the Reagan administration, will be appointed as the replacement to head the Civil Administration.¹⁰³

But the Rumsfeld-Powell power struggle continues on a more public note. Shortly after *The New York Times* dispatch hit the streets, Rumsfeld issued a snappy, 3-sentence press release -- terse and snappy -- which stated simply: "Jay Garner is doing a truly outstanding job for the nation. Any suggestions to the contrary is flat untrue and mischievous. The White House has made no announcement regarding other appointments." Either *The New York Times* made a big error, which isn't too likely, or the neo-conservatives applied pressure on the Oval Office. Whatever the outcome, it is not available at the time of this writing. That outcome will, however, influence the appointment of an Interim Authority which in turn will be responsible for setting up the "representative" government.

<u>Interim Authority</u> -- Zalmay Khalizad,¹⁰⁵ the President's Special envoy to the Free Iraqis, works under the Civil Administration to coordinate ways in which the Iraqi's might play an increasing role in administering their country. Here again, conflict rages within the Bush administration over who would be the leader of an interim Iraqi government. Fifty-four year old Ahmad Chalabi, leader of an exile group called the Iraqi National Congress,¹⁰⁶ and descendent of a rich Shiite Muslim family, was nominated by the Defense Department. Chalabi is also a professional banker who embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars in Jordan during the early 1980s. He was found guilty and sentenced to 22 years in prison but managed to escape from Jordan to London.

After Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Chalabi emerged as the self-proclaimed figurehead of Iraqi opposition in exile. Following that, he came under suspicion regarding use of CIA funds furnished to his Iraqi National Congress. Then only a few months previous to his nomination as the Interim Authority, he again fell from grace regarding half of the \$4.3 million in US aid granted the Iraqi National Congress. ¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³Weisman, 2 May 2003.

¹⁰⁴Defense Link, 2 May 2003.

¹⁰⁵Following the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, Khalizad was appointed US Special Envoy to Afghanistan. Born near Kabul, he emigrated to the US at an early age, attended US universities, and then held various high-level positions in government and prestigious think tanks. While working at Rand Corporation, he was consultant to Unocal on the CentGas pipeline.

¹⁰⁶The Iraqi National Congress was set up by the CIA as an Iraqi opposition group in 1992. The US has donated millions of dollars toward its operation -- much of it is unaccounted for because of poor bookkeeping. Chalabi claims to be a leader.

¹⁰⁷The military wing of the US-backed Iraqi National Congress are the Free Iraqi Forces. They are trained and equipped by the US. After the occupation of Baghdad by the US, members of this militia were arrested for looting while wearing their US-issued uniforms.

State Secretary Powell and the CIA opposed Chalabi, saying he had lost touch after being in exile for over four decades. Since he left Iraq in 1958, Powell's State Department doubts he will have much influence now on the Iraqi people. Nevertheless, Chalabi in early April 2003 established his residence in Baghdad's luxurious Hunter's Club.

This is the man the Pentagon wants to head the Interim Authority and work closely with the Military Authority and Civil Adminstration until a representative Iraqi government can be established. Whether or not he will actually be chosen remains to be seen. Retired General Gardner, currently head of the Civil Administration, made it clear in late April that although Chalabi has been asserting himself since arriving in Baghdad he is not the coalition's candidate -- but that a decision would be made soon. Perhaps the general had heard some inside information about being replaced.

Under the Interim Authority, according to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, the Iraqi National Congress will advise US and British authorities, a "judicial council" will revise Iraq's legal structure, and a "constitutional commission" will draft a new constitution.

In late April 2003 the Pentagon sent the first of a team of about 150 Iraqi exiles to staff the 23 ministries of Iraq's government. It hopes to have the Interim Authority set up by the end of May 2003.

Representative Government -- Bush administration plans on what a Representative Government consists of, or how it will be achieved, has never been publicly disclosed in any detail. Ostensibly it is a "democracy" set up so the Iraqis can run their country themselves. At least that is what the Bush administration has in mind. But it has been stated that this "democracy" won't be a mirror image of American democracy.

There are many factions vying for control in the new Iraqi government. Dozens of political parties are popping up in Baghdad. They include three known Islamic parties, five Kurdish parties, the communist party, five parties run by generals returning from exile, and the US-backed Iraqi National congress. Of most concern to Bush administration plans is the unexpected resurgence of the anti-American Shia Muslims, who comprise 60 percent of the population, in demanding an Islamic state. This goes head on against any plans for a democracy. Some observers predict there won't be any representative elections for quite some time.

One thing is for certain, along with the authority to run their own government will go the responsibility of Iraqi's taking care of their own people in a country that has been demolished by sanctions and war, thus relieving the treaty-mandated burden of meeting humanitarian needs which currently rests on US and British occupation forces. But as far as any meaningful governing by the people, there is much doubt. As long as US troops are in Iraq, the country will be under the domination of US Central Command. And there has been no timetable set for withdrawal of those troops.

2. Reconstruction: The Riches of War.

The Bush administration insists that the invasion of Iraq was not a war for oil. To a small extent that is accurate. It is a war for oil *and* many reconstruction jobs. Reconstruction of the country is a monstrous project after it has been bombarded by 15,000 precision-guided munitions, 7,500 unguided bombs, and 750 cruise missiles (as of 13 April 2003). After the country has undergone this terrific "Shock and Awe" treatment, and the weapons peddlers are making their

¹⁰⁸Cited in Youssef and Tamayo.

fortune restocking the US arsenal with the latest high-tech devices, then the large construction companies move in to "rebuild" Iraq. Furthermore, these lucrative prime contracts are only going to American companies -- and then only those chosen by the Bush administration will have a chance to bid for the work. The UN and Europe will have no authority in the matter. Not even British companies, those from America's "coalition" partner who actually sent combat troops to Iraq, will have a crack at the post-war plum. Foreign companies may, however, be hired as subcontractors by the US prime contract managers. Congress has appropriated \$2.5 billion for reconstruction during fiscal year 2003, but those costs could eventually reach as high as \$100 billion. The Bush administration claims that after the first year oil production will cover the costs of reconstruction. That will help eventually but not right away. Iraq still owes between \$60 billion and \$100 billion in accumulated foreign debts. Paying those off, in addition to just feeding and taking care of the Iraqi people who have been ravaged by 12 years of war and sanctions, will take some time.

Not long after the shooting started, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) gave Stevedoring Services a \$4.8 million management contract to operate Umm Qasr on the Persian Gulf, Iraq's only seaport.

Then before the shooting stopped, the US Army Corps of Engineers gave Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR -- a subsidiary of Halliburton of which Dick Cheney was CEO before becoming the US vice president) a \$7 billion initial contract without competitive bidding to fight the oil well fires that Saddam Hussein was expected to ignite. The Army said it was awarded under a pre-existing deal with the company, which raised question as to when the contract was negotiated. KBR also has a reputation for overcharging the government. For instance: 109

- The US General Accounting Office found in 1997 that KBR overcharged the government for work in the Balkans, such a \$85.98 per sheet for plywood that cost \$14.06.
- A 2000 report on the Balkans showed that KBR charged for cleaning the same offices up to four times a day.
- KBR paid a \$2 million fine in February 2002 for inflating prices for repairs and maintenance at Fort Ord, California.

Besides overcharging the government, Halliburton has been doing business with states that sponsor terrorism. In a letter to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld dated 30 April 2003, Congressman Henry A. Waxman, ranking minority member of the House Committee on Government Reform, pointed out that "there is evidence from press accounts and other sources that indicates that Halliburton has profited from business dealings with state sponsors of terrorism, including two of the three members of President Bush's 'axis of evil'." He noted that Halliburton and its subsidiaries have been linked to Iran, Iraq, and Libya, and that since at least the 1980s federal law has prohibited US companies from doing business in one or more of these countries. After going into pages of detail on these business dealings, Waxman requested answers to six questions, one of which was: "What steps, if any, has the Administration taken or does it plan to take to ensure that taxpayer dollars do not go to companies that do business with state sponsors of terrorism -- particularly when those dollars are being spent to combat terrorism."

¹⁰⁹Overcharges cited in Strope.

¹¹⁰All quotations in this paragraph from Waxman letter, 30 April 2003.

As it turned out, there were not many oil wells ignited. Those that were torched are now extinguished and the work load has been reduced drastically. A more moderate new contract will be for \$600 million. Fluor (one of the world's largest procurement and construction companies) and Bechtel (described below) are also expected to bid.

DynCorp received a multi-million dollar contract to police post-war Iraq for the State Department. It has been recruiting people with a background in police, security, and prison work --but only US citizens. Some circles are worried about this contract because of DynCorp's record in policing work. A British employment tribunal recently forced the company to pay £110,000 (about \$155,000) compensation to Kathy Bolkovak, a UN police officer fired by DynCorp for blowing the whistle on an illegal sex ring. DynCorp contracted personnel to the UN police services in Bosnia and they became involved with marketing prostitutes, one as young as twelve. Several were also accused of videotaping the rape of a woman. In Columbia, DynCorp was involved in spraying herbicides to kill cocaine crops. Farmers in Neighboring Ecuador filed a class action suit alleging that spray drifted over the border killing legitimate crops, causing illness, and killing children. The allegations are denied by DynCorp.¹¹¹ This is the company contracted to maintain civil law and order in Iraq.

More recently, on 17 April 2003, construction giant Bechtel Corporation won the contract to rebuild much of Iraq's infrastructure. USAID made the award which was initially \$34.6 million. But that opened the door for larger contracts over the 18 months following hostilities worth as much as \$680 million. Plans for just 6 months are to open 1,500 miles of roads and bridges, repair 15 percent of the high-voltage electrical grid, provide half the population to basic health services (including safe sewage disposal and pure water), renovate and supply several thousand schools, and improve 5,000 houses and 3,000 slum dwellings.

Bechtel was one of only six companies invited to bid on this contract. The invitation-only bidding by selected companies, all handled in secrecy, has come under fire from Congress and also from European countries who complain about the US-only bidding process. According to *The Economist*: "Even before the fighting began, the Bush administration had secretly invited bids for work to rebuild Iraq's battered roads, power plants, oil wells and so on." This invitation was extended in January 2003.

Bechtel has close ties with the Bush administration. A senior vice president of Bechtel is Jack Sheehan, a retired Marine Corps general who sits on the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board. George Schultz, a former secretary of state and also a former president of Bechtel, currently sits on the Bechtel board of directors while at the same time chairing the advisory board of the pro-war Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. In February 2003 Riley Bechtel, chairman and CEO of Bechtel Corp., was named to the president's Export Council, a White House advisory group on trade matters.

Furthermore, according to a *The New Yorker* article, Bechtel still has an ongoing relationship with the bin Laden family through \$10 million in shares of the Fremont Group.¹¹⁴ The Fremont Group was until 1986 a subsidiary of Bechtel called Bechtel Investments. Today it's website announces "though now independent, Fremont enjoys a close relationship with Bechtel."¹¹⁵

¹¹¹Information on DynCorp cited in Barnett.

¹¹²The other five US companies invited to bid were Fluor, Parsons, Louis Berger Group, Halliburton, and Washington group International.

¹¹³The Economist, 16 April 2003.

¹¹⁴See Mayer.

¹¹⁵Cited in Mayer.

Bechtel also has a poor track record for cost overruns. Andrew Natsios, currently head of USAID, was accused of cronyism after Bechtel was awarded the reconstruction contracts. Bechtel was in March 2003 called to explain its management of America's largest public works project, a \$14.6 billion highway tunneled under Boston -- the "Big Dig," Started in the 1980s at a projected cost of \$2.5 billion, it is grossly over cost and way behind schedule. It won't be completed now until 2004. Natsios was chief executive of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority during 2000 and 2001 when the biggest jump in costs took place -- from \$10.8 billion to \$14.6 billion. Besides being the largest public works project in America, it also has the largest cost overrun. Even while this issue is still smoldering Natsios, now as head of USAID, has awarded Bechtel another potential multi-billion dollar project.

The overall reconstruction of Iraq is a huge project that has been estimated to cost up to \$100 billion. It will involve repairing or rebuilding some: 118

- 100 hospitals and re-stocking.
- 6,000 schools and re-supplying.
- 45 urban water systems.
- 10 electrical generating plants.
- 110 electrical substations.
- 100 bridges.
- 600 miles of irrigation and drainage canals.
- Dredge the Umm Qasr port.

Getting all the railways running again and repairing all the roads and sewer systems are additional items. The listing here is not necessarily inclusive.

The Bush administration is implying that reconstruction will eventually be paid for by the Iraqis themselves -- from their future oil revenues. That's what Bush means when he says the oil money will be used to benefit the Iraqi people. That's why Colin Powell can say: "We're going to use the assets of the people of Iraq, especially their oil assets, to benefit their people."

Senator Ron Wyden is challenging this loathsome process of US taxpayers picking up the tab while select corporations have a lock on Iraq. He is one of the lead sponsors of legislation that would require a "fully open, competitive bidding process" with public disclosure at every step of the way. He continues: "You look at this process, which is secret, limited or closed bidding, and you have to ask yourself: 'Why are these companies being picked? How's this process taking place, and is this the best use of scarce taxpayer money at a time when seniors can't afford medicine, kids are having trouble getting access to quality education and local communities are just getting pounded?' The administration has been keeping the taxpayers in the dark with respect to how this money is being used, and that information ought to be shared."

¹¹⁶Cited in Vennochi.

¹¹⁷Cited in Morgan and Vulliamy.

¹¹⁸See Matthews.

¹¹⁹Cited in Jones.

¹²⁰Cited in Herbert.

On 8 April 2003, Congressmen Henry Waxman and John Dingell asked the US General Accounting Office to investigate how the Bush administration is awarding the reconstruction contracts. They are concerned that a broader spectrum of business is not involved, that the bidding process is diluted, and that secrecy prevents all this from being known.

Meanwhile, European and other countries are seething that their businesses are being excluded from what appears to be a very lucrative project. As *The Guardian's* Naomi Klein expressed it: "Rather than rebuilding, the country is being treated as a blank slate on which the most ideological Washington neo-liberals can design their dream economy: fully privatized, foreign-owned and open for business." ¹²¹

3. The Oil Interests.

Iraq's Proven oil reserve of 112.5 billion barrels is the second highest proven reserve in the world. But Iraq has possible and probable reserves of roughly 220 billion barrels, and its actual petroleum potential may be far higher than that because the country is relatively unexplored due to war and sanctions. Iraq is America's 6^{th} largest foreign supplier.

The US appears to have plans of structuring the Iraqi oil industry similar to a US corporation, with a 15-member international advisory board, a chairman, and a chief executive. Although this panel is called an advisory board, it is expected to act similar to a board of directors on investment decisions, capital spending, and production.

This advisory board will be controlled by Americans and Iraqis of US choice. Philip Carroll, former CEO of the US division of Royal Dutch Shell, has been lined up as the chairman of the board. The vice chairman could be Fadhil Othman who was in charge of Iraq's oil marketing before Saddam came to power. The CEO is expected to come from the existing oil ministry and day-to-day operations will be a team carefully selected by the US from existing Iraqi oil officials and those in exile. David Teather of *The Guardian* points out that this type of American involvement could expose the US "to the accusation that it is attempting to take control of the industry and open the door to foreign investment -- a perception the Bush administration is keen to avoid." 122

One obstacle in the way of US plans is the Oil For Food program. It was imposed by the UN Security Council until Iraq is certified free of weapons of mass destruction. The certification has to be made by the UN inspection team and they can't do that until the US allows them back into the country. So far the US has refused. The Security Council -- with France, Russia, and China threatening a veto -- will not lift the Oil For Food program without that certification. As the program stands now, Iraq can sell all the oil it wants but the UN holds all the proceeds in an escrow account so they can only be used for humanitarian purposes in Iraq and for paying off Iraq's Gulf war debts. The US does not want the Security Council to control Iraq's oil income. The Oil For Food program must be renewed periodically and the current expiration date is 3 June 2003. Whether the US can or will block an extension remains to be seen.

The Oil For Food program applies only to production, not reconstruction and modernization. Iraq's petroleum industry is run down and obsolete after twelve years of sanctions. Rebuilding it to the latest technology involves more lucrative contracts. Fluor (Aliso Viejo, California) and Amec (London, England) have formed a joint venture to bid on a USAID contract for reconstruction of the

¹²¹Klein.

¹²²Teather.

oil industry.¹²³ The teaming of these two giant engineering-and-construction companies will give Britain a chance to share a prime contract. Fluor will hold a 51 percent share, thus keeping the contract under US control. Other American companies will undoubtedly also compete for the contracts.

The reason France, Russia, and China would veto a resolution to withdraw the Oil For Food program without certification is because their oil companies had signed several multi-billion dollar agreements with Saddam.. Spain, Italy, India, and Turkey also have a prior claim but they do not have veto power in the Security Council. All of these agreements are estimated at totaling \$38 billion. According to David Caron, a professor at University of California/Berkeley's Boalt Hall School of Law, under the 1907 Hague Convention the US would be present in Iraq as an occupying power and would hold the countries resources in trust. It could rebuild Iraq's oil infrastructure but probably would have to recognize contracts that oil companies from France, China, and Russia have signed with Saddam's regime. In addition, prior contracts must be honored under international commercial law. Malcolm Forster of the London firm, Freshfields, states: "The government is an agent of the state and any new regime would be bound by contracts entered into by a previous government."

Russia's Lukoil has several oil field development contracts in the huge West Qurna complex. This could eventually bring in \$40 billion. In addition, Iraq still owes Russia some \$8 billion. France's TotalFinaElf signed a protocol agreement for two of the five giant oil fields in Majnoon and Bin-Umar. The China National Petroleum Company has a 50 percent production sharing agreement in the large Al-Ahdab oil field. These companies won't give up easily and will appeal to the Arbitrage Court in Geneva which would immediately put a freeze on the reserves. This could hold up development of the affected fields for at least five years.

There are some in the Bush administration, even the White House, who favor appropriating all Iraqi oil money as "spoils of war." A source for *Newsday* stated: "There are people in the White House who take the position that it's all the spoils of war. We [the United States] take all the oil money until there is a new democratic government [in Iraq]." The source said the Justice Department has its doubts. But another *Newsday* source said there are those in Vice President Dick Cheney's office who support this position. If this "spoils of war" notion becomes official US policy there is much trouble brewing ahead.

III. CONCLUSION

In this paper I have outlined how a group of individuals, with the power of wealth and position, have used their resources to enhance their own interests without regard for their country, their fellow human beings, or the condition of planet earth for future generations. They started by

 $^{^{123}\}mathrm{This}$ contract offered by USAID should not be confused with the Army Corp. of Engineers contract issued earlier for fighting oil well fires.

¹²⁴Cited in Epstein.

¹²⁵Cited in *Economist*, The.

¹²⁶Cited in Royce.

¹²⁷See Royce.

adopting an outrageous goal and relentlessly sticking to the attainment of that goal in the face of reasonable rebuttals, indignant responses, obvious corruption, blatant deception, and smeared reputations. It does not matter that their behavior is obviously illegal or logically unwise. So long as that self-serving goal is achieved they can weather domestic opposition and world indignation.

Then when a sympathetic president was put in the White House, representatives of those ambitious men were able to infiltrate the administration to see their stratagem codified as the National Security Policy of the United States of America. The September 11th tragedy was a propitious event for them to launch their plan of preemptive aggression and start on the way to achieving long-planned goals.

Iraq was the first test and the stepping stone to subjugating Middle East riches. In the face of opposition from America's staunchest allies, and with the help of distorted intelligence information, the Bush administration invaded Iraq. Contrary to the dubious information received from Iraqi dissidents who had been in exile for years, even decades, and who had their own agenda to achieve, American troops were not heartily welcomed and assisted by the Iraqi people. In spite of all the propaganda about a war of liberation, the "coalition" forces were cast in the role of imposters. Operation Iraqi Freedom has turned out to be a war of conquest.

This role of conqueror became all the more clear when setting up a post-war government and reconstruction of the country began. Just as the Bush administration ignored the international community in going to war, it shut out other countries after the fighting was over. As soon as the strategic locations were occupied, and the oil fields secured, the UN and Europe were informed that America would make the decisions and control the lucrative business contracts. Even America's staunch "coalition" ally, Britain, would have to take a back seat.

I fear that the invasion of Iraq -- another assault on a Muslim country by America -- has actually created one of the conditions Bush tried to sell as justification for that invasion. I worry that the war has brought Iraq and Al Qaida together in a mutual rage and hatred of America. In February 2003, at the height of Bush administration attempts to show a linkage between Iraq and Al Qaida, an audio tape purportedly made by Osama bin Laden was released by the Qatar-based television network Al-Jazeera. It called for martyrdom (suicide) operations and for all Islam to help their fellow Muslims if Iraq is invaded. The tape urged: "Fighting should be for Allah only, not to support nationalism or pagan regimes in all the Arab countries, including Iraq." It continued: "True Muslims should act, incite and mobilize the nation in such great events ... This war concerns the Muslims regardless of whether the socialist party and Saddam remain or go." 128

That tape was used by the Bush administration to support their alleged connection between Iraq and Al Qaida. But whether it is authentic or propaganda for political purposes, it conveys typical Muslim reactions to an attack on Islamic lands -- a reaction which has been clearly exemplified in the past. Previous US attacks -- Desert Storm, the retaliatory cruise missile raids on Afghanistan and Sudan, and Desert Fox, as examples -- all created a similar reaction in the Muslim world and stimulated the growth of a world Islamist movement.

There are signs of Al Qaida type activity in Iraq since the invasion. The Shiite Muslims of south -- the Muslim group that makes up 60 percent of the Iraqi population -- have made no secret of their hostility. Although they, themselves, are split into three factions, they have close religious ties to adjacent Iran -- an Islamic state which is the seat of global terrorist and HizbAllah International, on whose strategy-planning Committee of Three bin Laden sits. Bin Laden was also

¹²⁸Associated Press, 12 February 2003.

involved with the defeat of the US in Somalia, the first collaboration of Sunni and Shiite Muslim terrorists, where US troops were drawn into what was believed to be an easy victory and then ambushed.

They already have armed militias and control a good share of southern Iraq which is too large for the small invasion force to fully occupy. Even Baghdad, alone, cannot be fully controlled. The pilgrimage of about two million Shiites to a shrine in Karbala, which ended in a political rally to oust Americans, was way beyond control of US and British troops. On 8 April 2003 an Iraqi-born Muslim cleric in Iran, issued a fatwa which was delivered to all Shiite Mullahs in Iraq, to preach in their mosques. Among other things it called the cleric's followers to "raise peoples' awareness of the Great Satan's plans and means to abort them."

The Sunni Muslims also have militias and have even set up check points in Baghdad. The demonstration in al-Fallujah, a city of 200,000 located 30 miles west of Baghdad, where US soldiers fired into demonstrations killing and wounding scores of civilians, appears to be orchestrated. Al-Fallujah had received favorable treatment under Saddam's regime and opposes his overthrow. Even this situation can be exploited by Islamist radicals. Placing a member of the "martyr battalion" amid a crowd of demonstrators to shoot at the US military, is certain to provoke return fire under the "rules of engagement" those soldiers are ordered to follow.

Again, the belief that Sunni and Shiite Muslim religions have always opposed each other and are not likely to collaborate, does not hold for Islamists. Fundamentalist extremists from both sects have long ago learned to work together toward a common goal. The fact that bin Laden, a Sunni, sits on the Committee of Three for HizbAllah International, controlled by Shiite Iran, attests to that mutual cooperation.

The Kurdish population in the north also have militias totaling about 30,000 which are split about evenly between the two opposing factions. Although the Kurds have helped the US to a certain extent during the fighting in the north, they have strong aspirations for an independent Kurdistan . They also want control of the huge Kirkuk oil fields. This is certain to spark revolt when they find out the US has no intentions of allowing either.

Most people in Iraq are glad to see Saddam gone, but they would rather he not have been deposed by America. Hatred and grief abound over the destruction of their country and the loss of uncounted and unreported thousands of relatives and friends -- perhaps tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands. Meanwhile, besides opposition by the people, there are other consequences of the war. Land mines and unexploded bombs continue to take their toll on civilians, especially curious children. Humanitarian needs are lacking and slow in coming. People lack food, pure water, health care, and proper living conditions while the US haggles with the UN and Europe over who should pay for the aid and who should have control of the oil revenues.

That is not the end. Although US and British physical casualties were light as wars go, the psychological effect on the surviving troops is phenomenal. They have been put in a position where they are ordered to use deadly fire in certain high stress circumstances. The youth in America, with

¹²⁹The media was full of reports about this pilgrimage. As an example see Smith, 22 April 2003.

¹³⁰A fatwa is a an edict, or decree, issued by a Muslim leader or scholar, or a group of Muslim leaders and/or scholars, or an Islamic court, which provides guidance on meeting challenges. Fatwas are obligatory.

¹³¹Cited in Smith, 26 April 2003.

loved ones and families to go home to, are put in the position of killing first and finding out if it was a terrorist, an Iraqi family, or an unarmed civilian afterwards. Involvement in atrocities seems unavoidable in a setting where the "liberated" people are hostile. Shock and Awe has had its effect on our own troops. From past experience the military planners realize this effect is not something to be ignored. 132

All US soldiers heading home are now required to go through "critical event stress debriefing" sessions. That is a tranquilizing phrase for unteaching the killing skills that soldiers learn in combat. It is an attempt to counter the violence one participates in on the battlefield. It was not easy to live with violence. Not easy being ordered to leave a dead comrade behind, lying on the road. Not easy shooting at cars that don't heed warning shots. Not easy opening fire on armed opponents hiding in a crowd of civilians. These events rise to the boiling point of seething anger — anger which often manifests itself in more violence. Soldiers become trained killers. They are hit men who kill when ordered to do so. They are impressionable youth put in a position of being killed or be killed. These are the people that war creates. These are the people who cannot just be turned loose in society. Thus the need for "critical event stress debriefing," for what good it does.

In this paper I have shown how neo-conservatives have prevailed in their ideas, and established those ideas as policy in the Bush administration. I have shown how they push those ideas along, unrelentingly, undeterred by opposition, unmoved by consequences. They make up stories to justify their actions as they move along. When those stories are proved false, they shrug their shoulders and move still further. The idea is to just keep moving. In this milieu we can be certain that occupying Iraq will not satisfy the appetite of those neo-conservatives. Preemptive force will be used again and again to establish America's dominant position in key areas of the world. This is the American Peace they dream about. This is Pax Americana.

#####

¹³²As examples, the violence brought home by soldiers who had seen combat in Afghanistan was horrifying. At Fort Bragg, alone, four soldiers shot their spouses and two committed suicide. (Cited in Taibbi) Everyone remembers the Oklahoma City bombing perpetrated by Timothy McVey, a veteran of the 1991 Gulf war.

REFERENCES

Agence France Presse; "Ex Spies Slam US Over Failure To Find WMDs," 18 April 2003.

Aldrick, Philip; "Amec Joins Fluor In Iraq Work Bid," Daily Telegraph (UK), 25 April 2003.

Associated Press, "Power of Encouragement?," ABCNews.com, 7 February 2003.

Associated Press, "Excerpts of Audiotape Urging 'Martyrdom'," published in San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 12 February 2003.

Associated Press, "Security Council Balks At Postwar Plans," published in *The New York Times*, 10 April 2003.

Associated Press, "US-trained Troops 'Caught Looting In Baghdad'," published in *Ananova* (a British publication), 22 April 2003. Available at http://www.ananova,com/news/story/sm_773253.html

Bannerjee, Ruben; "Britain Admits There May Be No WMDs In Iraq," *Al Jazeera* (an Arab satellite channel funded by the Emir of Qatar), 6 April 2003.

Barnett, Antony; "Scandal-Hit US Firm Wins Key Contracts," The Observer (London), 13 April 2003.

Bender, Bryan; "Pressure To Find Weapons Mounts," Boston Globe, 17 April 2003.

Bodansky, Yossef; *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America* (Roseville, CA; Prima Publishing, a division of Random House; 1999,2001).

Bookman, Jay; "The President's Real Goal In Iraq," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 29 September 2002.

Borger, Julian; "White House 'Exaggerating Iraqi Threat'," The Guardian (London), 9 October 2002.

Becker, Elizabeth, and Oppel Jr., Richard A.; "US Gives Bechtel A Major Contract In Rebuilding Iraq," *The New York Times*, 17 April 2003.

Burkeman, Oliver; "Bechtel Wins Contract Prize," The Guardian, 18 April 2003.

Burns, Robert: "Former pentagon Official Richard Perle Resigns As Key Rumsfeld Adviser," *Boston Globe*, 27 March 2003.

Carnegie Endowment Proliferation Brief, "Origins of Regime Change in Iraq," 19 March 2003. Available at http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Originsofregimechangeiniraq.asp?from=pubdate

Carr, Simon; "The Sketch: Blair Astonishes Onlookers With a Frank Answer to Parliament's Greybeards," *The Independent* (London), 22 January 2003.

Charbonneau, Louis; "UN Official: Fake Iraq Nuke Papers Were Crude," Reuters, 25 March 2003.

Clinton letter -- Written to the president and signed by 18 prominent conservatives, dated 26 January 1998.

Cornwell, Rupert; "Turf War Rages in Washington Over Who Will Rule Iraq," *The Independent* (London), 5 April 2003.

Defense Link, "Statement By Secretary Of Defense Rumsfeld," 2 May 2003. This press release is available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/b05022003_bt296-03.html

Economist, *The*; "A Post-War Pot Of Gold," 16 April 2003. This article is available at http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=1708304

Ensor, David; "Fake Iraq Documents 'Embarrassing' for US," CNN Washington Bureau, 14 March 2003. This article is available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents

Epstein, Edward; "Firm Linked To Cheney Wins Oil Field Contract," San Francisco Chronicle, 8 March 2003.

Farebrother, George and Mcvey, Kitty; editors; "The United Nations is not Above the Law: The Security Council Can Take 'Adequate Measures' Short of War," a dossier published by Institute For Law And Peace, February 2003.

Feith, Douglas; "Defense Official Lists Five U.S. Objectives in a Post-War Iraq," 11 February 2003. Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/text2003/0211defense.htm

Fleishman, Jeffrey; "Militants' Crude Camp Casts Doubt On US Claims," Los Angeles Times, 27 April 2003.

Fowler, Jonathan (Associated Press writer); "Annan Labels Coalition 'Occupying Force'," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 24 April 2003.

Frontline, "The War Behind Closed Doors," PBS documentary, 2003. Excerpts from 1992 draft of the Defense Planning Guidance available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html

Gellman, Barton; interview with Frontline (PBS), 20 February 2003, at http://inner-outerpeaceproject.net/BartonGellman.htm

Gellman, Barton; "Iraq Arms hunt Erodes US Assurance," *Washington Post* article posted on MSNBC website, 22 April 2003. Available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/903374asp?0na=x2202121

Guggenheim, Ken; "Senator Seeks FBI Probe of Iraq Documents," Associated Press, 15 March 2003.

Gumbel, Andrew; "America Targeted 14,000 Sites. So Where Are The Weapons Of Mass Destruction?," *The Independent* (London), 13 April 2003.

Hanley, Charles J.; "US Troops Fire On Iraq Protesters Again," Associated Press Dispatch, 1 May 2003.

Herbert, Bob; "What Is It Good For?" The New York Times, 21 April 2003.

Hull, Dana; "Bechtel Awarded Contract In Iraq," San Jose (CA) Mercury News, 18 April 2003.

Ibarguen, Diego; "UN Panel Declares Iraq Not A Threat," San Jose (CA) Mercury News, 20 March 2003.

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Central Intelligence Agency report, October 2002.

Ivins, Molly Fort Worth Star-Telegraph columnist); "Bush Offers Crooks and Warmongers To Lead Iraq," published in The Daily Camera, 9 April 2003.

Jehl, Douglas and Perlez, Jane; "Pentagon Sending A Team Of Exiles To Help Run Iraq," *The New York Times*, 26 April 2003.

Jelinek, Pauline; "No Weapons Detected At 80 Sites On Top 100 List," Associated Press dispatch posted on Newark New Jersey website, NJ.com, sponsored by Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital, 24 April 2003. Available at http://www.njo.com/news/ledger/index.ssf//base/news-8/1051164671315630.xml

Jones, Terry; "Welcome Aboard The Iraqi Gravy Train," The Observer (London), 13 April 2003.

Kessler, Glen; "US Decision On Iraq Has Puzzling Past," Washington Post, 12 January 2003.

Kington, Tom; "Italy To Send Military Units To Iraq," Defense News, 21 April 2003.

Klein, Norman; "Bomb Before You Buy: What Is Being Planned For Iraq Is Not Reconstruction But Robbery," *The Guardian* (London), 14 April 2003.

Landay, Jonathan S. and Kuhnhenn, James; "CIA Chief Downplays Iraqi Threat," San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 9 October 2002.

Lashmar, Paul and Whitaker, Raymond; "M16 and CIA: The New Enemy Within," *The Independent* (London), 9 February 2003.

Little, Robert; "US Victory Has Steep Price In Maintaining Safe Iraq Peace: International Law Places Demands On Occupier," *Baltimore Sun*, 18 April 2003.

Lobe, Jim; "The Anniversary of a Neo-Imperial Moment," AlterNet.org, 12 September 2002, available at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=14099

Lumpkin, John J.; "Ex-CIA Officers Questioning Iraq Data," Associated Press, 14 March 2003.

Mackay, Neil; "Bush Planned Iraq 'Regime Change' Before Becoming President," *Sunday Herald* (Glasgow, Scotland), 15 September 2002.

Mackay, Neil; "Why the CIA Thinks Bush is Wrong," Sunday Herald (Glasgow, Scotland), 13 October 2002.

Matthews, William; "Questions Swirl Around Iraq Rebuilding Jobs," Defense News, 14 April 2003.

Mayer, Jane; "Dept. Of Connections: The Contractors," The New Yorker, 5 May 2003.

Miller, Judith; "Report: Scientist Provides Arms Details, Iraqi Chemical Weapons Allegedly Destroyed," *The New York Times*, 21 April 2003.

Miller, Judith' "Focus Shifts From Weapons To The People Behind Them," The New York Times, 22 April 2003.

Morgan, Oliver And Vulliamy, Ed; "Cronies Set To Make A Killing," The Observer (London), 6 April 2003.

Naim, Mona; "The Pentagon's 'Trainee,' Ahmad Chalabi, Claims To Be Representative Of a New Iraq," *Le Monde*, 7 April 2003.

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The; September 2002 (released 20 September 2002).

New York Times, The; "Fuzzy Math On Iraq," 27 April 2003.

Pincus, Walter; "Alleged Al Qaida Link To Iraq Questioned: Connections Asserted By US Challenged," *Washington Post* dispatch published in San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 7 February 2003.

Plesch, Dan; "US Claim Dismissed By Bix," The Guardian (London), 5 February 2003.

Powell Speech -- "Iraq: Denial and Deception," White House press release, 5 February 2003. Full text and visual-aid slides available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html Page numbers cited in footnotes may vary depending on how this document is printed from the internet.

Puzzanghera, Jim; "Key Advisers See Iraq War As Test Case," San Jose (CA) Mercury News, 19 March 2003.

Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century, a report of The Project for the New American Century, September 2000.

Resolution 660, adopted by the UN Security Council on 2 August 1990.

Resolution 678, adopted by the UN Security Council on 29 November 1990.

Resolution 687, adopted by the UN Security Council on 3 April 1991.

Resolution 1441, adopted by the UN Security Council on 8 November 2002.

Reuters; "Blix: UN Inspectors Could Be Back In Iraq In Weeks," published in Boston Globe, 17 April 2003.

Roche, Mark; "The Headache Of Black Gold Ownership," Le Monde (Paris), 23 April 2003.

Rosenberg, Carol; "Political Parties Popping Up In Baghdad," San Jose (CA) Mercury News, 23 April 2003.

Rosenberg, Carol; "Independent Baghdad Militias Carve Out Turf," San Jose (CA) Mercury News, 30 April 2003.

Royce, Knut; "Plan: Tap Iraq's Oil," Newsday, 10 January 2003.

Starmer, Keir; "Sorry, Mr. Blair, but 1441 does not authorize force," *The Guardian* (London), 17 March 2003.

Stober, Dan; "Nuclear Inspectors Reportedly Angry: Checking False Leads Wasted Time, Source Says," San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 18 March 2003.

Perez, Jane; "US Overseer Arrives In Baghdad To Begin Interim Government," The New York Times, 21 April 2003.

Smith, Craig S.; "Elated Shiites, On Pilgrimage, Want US Out," The New York Times, 22 April 2003.

Smith, Craig S.; "Clerics In Iran Sat Shiites Must Act," The New York Times, 26 April 2003.

Strobel, Warren P., Landay, Jonathan S., and Walcott, John; "Bush Pushes for First Strike on Iraq: Evidence Not So Solid, Some Officials Say," San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 8 October 2002.

Strope, Leigh (Associated Press writer); "Congressman Questions Iraq Work Given To Halliburton Subsidiary Without Competition," San Francisco *Chronicle*, 11 April 2003.

Taibbi, Mike; "War Diary," NBC News, April 2003. At http://www.msnbc.com/news/906181.asp?0cv=CB20

Teather, David; "American To Oversee Iraqi Oil Industry," The Guardian, 26 April 2003.

Tenet letter -- Letter from George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Senator Bob Graham, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence; 7 October 2002.

Vennochi, Joan; "Boston, Baghdad, And Bechtel," Boston Globe, 22 April 2003.

Warrick, Joby; "Bush Evidence of Iraq 'Appetite' for Nuclear Weapons in Doubt," Washington Post, 23 January 2003.

Warrick, Joby; "Some Evidence On Iraq Called Fake: UN Nuclear Inspector Says Documents On Purchases Were Forged," *Washington Post*, 8 March 2003.

Washington File, "State Department Says Iran Seeking To Develop Nuclear Weapons," US State Department International Information Programs, 13 December 2002. Search at http://usinfo.state.gov/egi-bin/washfile/...

Washington File, "Transcript: Powell Draws Picture of Iraqi Deception, Links to Al Qaida," US State Department International Information Programs, 5 February 2003. Search at http://usinfo.state.gov/egi-bin/washfile/...

Washington File, "Plans For Bushehr reactor Indicate Iranian Nuclear Weapons Ambitions," US State Department International Information Programs, 11 February 2003. Search at http://usinfo.state.gov/egi-bin/washfile/...

Washington File, "Contingency Plans Under Way For Postwar Iraq, US Official Says," US State Department International Information Programs, 13 February 2003. Search at http://usinfo.state.gov/egi-bin/washfile/...

Washington File, "Legal Authority Exists For A Strike On Iraq,' By Ruth Wedgewood," US State Department International Information Programs, 20 March 2003. Search at http://usinfo.state.gov/egi-bin/washfile/...

Washington File, "Excerpt: Bush Has Legal Authority To Use Force In Iraq, Advisor Says," US State Department International Information Programs, 21 March 2003. Search at http://usinfo.state.gov/egi-bin/washfile/...

Washington File, "Powell Says US Wants Iraq Interim Authority In Place Quickly," US State Department International Information Programs, 7 April 2003. Search at http://usinfo.state.gov/egi-bin/washfile/...

Washington File, "Scholar Says US Has Legal Grounds For Iraq Invasion," US State Department International Information Programs, 9 April 2003. Search at http://usinfo.state.gov/egi-bin/washfile/...

Waxman letter -- Letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from Congressman Henry A. Waxman, ranking minority member of the House Committee on Government Reform, 30 April 2003.

Weblog, ""The Past as Prologue -- 1992 DPG (Defense Planning Document), 17 September 2002. Available at http://www.jimpivonka.com/unpublished/1992%20DPG.html

Weisman, Steven R.; "Pre-emption: Idea With a Lineage Whose Time Has Come," *The New York Times*, 23 March 2003.

Weisman, Steven R.; "US Set To Name Civilian To Oversee Iraq," The New York Times, 2 May 2003.

Youssef, Nancy A, and Tamayo, Juan O.; "Iraqi Deputy In US Custody," San Jose (CA) Mercury News, 25 April 2003.

GLOSSARY

AP Associated Press.

BBC British Broadcasting Company.
CBW Chemical-Biological Warfare.
CENTCOM The US Central Command.

CEO Chief Executive Officer (A corporate title).

CIA Central intelligence Agency.

CNN Cable News Network.

DPG Defense Planning Guidance, or Defense Policy Guidance.

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation.

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency.

Islamist A follower of the extremist, fundamentalist form of Islam -- a militant Muslim terrorist.

Jihad Islamic term for "Holy War."

KBR Kellogg, Brown & Root, a Halliburton subsidiary.
 M-16 British intelligence -- their counterpart to the CIA.

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NGO Non-Governmental Organization.

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

PBS Public Broadcasting System.

RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle.

UAE United Arab Emirates.

UK United Kingdom.

UN United Nations.
US United States.

USAID US Agency for International Development.

USN United States Navy.

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction -- nuclear, chemical, and biological.

APPENDIX-A

PLAYERS IN "PAX AMERICANA"

(More prominent players are highlighted) (Current positions in Government are also highlighted)

Abrams, Elliott Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in the Reagan administration.

Convicted in 1991 of two counts of lying to Congress but was granted a Christmas eve

pardon by George Bush Sr. a year later.

Currently senior director of the White House Security Council's office for

democracy, human rights, and international operations.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Armitage, Richard L. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan adminis-

tration

Presidential Negotiator, Ambassador, and Coordinator of Emergency

Humanitarian Assistance in the first Bush administration.

Currently Deputy Secretary of State (#2 spot in State Department).

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Barnett, Roger US Naval War College

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Bennett, William J. Secretary of Education in the Reagan administration.

Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy in the first Bush administration.

Currently Co-Director of Empower America. Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Bergner, Jeffrey Board Member of Hudson Institute.

Board Member of Asia Foundation. Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Bernstein, Alvin National Defense University

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Bolton, John R. Assistant Attorney General in Reagan administration.

Assistant secretary of State for International Organization Affairs in the first Bush

administration.

Currently Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

On Board of Directors for Project For The New American Century.

Cambone, Stephen In charge of strategic defense policy at Defense Department during first Bush admin.

Currently Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Contributed to The 2000 Report.

Cheney, Dick Secretary of Defense under the first Bush administration.

Headed Halliburton Corporation during the late 1990s

Currently Vice President.

Cohen, Eliot Member of Defense Department's policy planning staff during first Bush administration.

Currently member of the Defense Policy Board.

Professor and Director of Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Cross, Devon Gaffney On Board of Directors for Project For The New American Century.

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Dobriansky, Paula J. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the

first Bush administration.

Currently Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Donnelly, Thomas Principle Author of The 2000 Report.

Epstein, David Associated with Office of Secretary of Defense

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Fautua, David Lt. Col. US Army

History Professor at West Point Contributed to The 2000 Report

Feith, Douglas J. Currently Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Fukuyama, Francis Advisory Board Member of Endowment for Democracy.

Advisory Board Member of The New America Foundation.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Goure, Dan Center for Strategic and International Studies

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Jackson, Bruce P. On Board of Directors for Project For The New American Century.

Kagan, Donald Yale University

Formed Co-Chairman of Project for the New American Century

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Kagen, Fred US Military Academy at West Point

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Kagan, Robert Co-Founder of Project For The New American Century.

On Board of Directors for Project For The New American Century.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Khalizad, Zalmay Former UNOCAL advisor.

Former US Special Envoy to Afghanistan.

Currently US Special Envoy to the Iraqi opposition.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Killebrew, Robert Colonel, US Army (ret)

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Kristol, William Former Chief of Staff to Vice President Dan Quayle.

Co-Founder and current Chairman of Project For The New American Century.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Lagon, Mark Currently works with US State Department on international organization affairs

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Lasswell, James GAMA Corporation

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Libby, I. Lewis Advisor to State Department during Reagan administration.

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense during the first Bush administration.

Currently Chief of Staff for Vice President Dick Cheney.

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Martinage, Robert Senior Analyst, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Meilinger, Phil US Navy War College

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Owens, Mackubin Professor of Strategy and Force Planning, US Naval War College

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Perle, Richard Assistant Secretary of Defense in Reagan administration.

Member of American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Currently member of the Defense Policy Board.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Rodman, Peter W. Member of National Security council staff in Nixon and Ford administrations.

Director of State Department Policy Planning Staff in Reagan administration. Special Assistant to the President on National security Affairs in the first Bush

administration.

Currently Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Steve Rosen Harvard University

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Rumsfeld, Donald Ambassador to NATO in Nixon administration.

White House Chief of Staff in Ford administration.

Defense Secretary in Ford administration.

Currently Defense Secretary.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Schmitt, Gary Executive Director for Project For The New American Century.

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Schneider, William, Jr. Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology in Reagan

administration.

Chairman of President's General Advisory Committee for Arms Control and

Disarmament in first Bush administration.

President of International Planning Services, Inc (an international trade and finance

advisory firm).

Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute.

Currently Chairman of Defense Science Board.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Sheehan, Jack Retired Marine Corps. General

Senior Vice President of the Bechtel Group.

Currently member of the Defense Policy Board.

Shulsky, Abram The RAND Corporation

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Vickers, Michael Former Army Special Forces officer and CIA operative

Director of Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Watts, Barry Former Air Force officer

Headed the Gulf War Air Power Survey's work on operations and effectiveness Currently Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of the

Secretary of Defense

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Weber, Vin Vice Chairman of Empower America.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Wolfowitz, Paul Served in State Department during Reagan administration.

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy during first Bush administration. Dean international relations program at Johns Hopkins Univ. during 1990s Currently Deputy Defense Secretary (#2 spot in Defense Department).

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Woolsey, R. James Under Secretary of Navy in Carter administration.

Ambassador for negotiating the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty in first Bush

administration.

CIA Director in Clinton administration.

Trustee of The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Chairman of the advisory committee of the Clean Fuels Foundation

Currently member of the Defense Policy Board.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.

Zakheim, Dov Prepared Defense Planning Guidance for Nuclear War in Reagan administration

Served on "Vulcans" to advise then Gov. George W. Bush on international affairs. Currently Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer

Contributed to The 2000 Report

Zoellick, Robert B. Deputy Secretary of Treasury for Financial Institutions in Reagan administration.

Under secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs in first Bush

administration.

Currently US Trade Representative.

Signed 1998 letter to President Clinton.